
Class 



D -k 



PRESENTED BY 



A PLEA FOR HEDONISM 



A THESIS 



PRESENTED BY 



John C. Palmer, Jr., A. M., Ph. D., 

it 

Wellsburg, W. Va. 



For the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy, on Examination, in Course A. Philosophy, in 

the Po8t-Oraduate Department of the University of Wooster, 

June, 1903. 



Reprinted from the Post-Graduate and Wooster Quarterly for July, 1903. 



Herald Printing Co., 
Wooster, Ohio. 



» * 



* 



* * 



THE LIBRARY 
Or CONGRESS 

'* IwASHINGXON 






Joto C. Palmer, Jr., P,h. D., Wellsburg, W. Va. 



A Graduating Thesis;. Course A, Philosophy. 



I.. INTRODUCTORY. 

It is the purpose of this essay to show that the ulti- 
mate ethical question is the question, of the consequences 
of our actions. Ethics has to deal with human conduct 
and its consequences. The consequences of conduct 
determine the permissibility or advisability of the 
conduct. I expect further to show that it is the pleasant 
or painful consequences of our acts in which we are inter- 
ested. If we were not sentient creatures, that is, if we 
merely had knowledge without any feeling of pleasure or 
pain in that knowledge, with that knowledge there would 
be no problem of conduct, for there would be no conduct. 
In other words, our sentience lies at the base of our activ- 
ity. 1 To put the matter in terms of mechanics, it is 
because we find ourseves in unstable equilibrium, in a 
state of unrest or discomfort, that we act. Our actions 
are for the sake of establishing a new equilibrium in our 
sentient consciousness. 



*See Taylor, The Problem of Conduct, Page 338. 



9 






A Plea for Hedoi&Bin: 



•f 



In the following discussion, Iassupadthat a man is a per- 
sonality , a center of * intelligent activity. He is different 
from the brook ap,^ the growing tree, even though we can- 
not state the difference "in terms of human speech. He is 
different again from a meracreature of instinct and impulse. 
His intelligence makes him an original center of force, 
even though we, cannot explain the nature of voluntary 
activity, or conduct.. These assumptions are not 
intended to settle any metaphysical controversy. But 
unless we make such assumptions, man becomes a mere 
machine, an irresponsible and delusive mechanism. 
Ethics, from her place as the queen of science, is degraded 
to a subordinate place among the mechanical sciences. 
Such a conclusion would involve consequences too serious 
to be lightly accepted. If man is a machine, political 
science and theology are as meaningless as astrology and 
magic. 3 

Hedonism does not require the assumption of a pur- 
pose in the universe, yet it welcomes such an assumption, 
so long as one takes all the facts of human existence into 
account. Neither does Hedonism assume the immor- 
tality of the human soul,, nor even its existence after 
death. But here again it welcomes any light which re- 
ligion or theology can throw upon the subject of man's 
destiny. Starting with man as a sentient, intelli- 
gent consciousness, Hedonism seeks to determine his re- 
lation to the rest of Universe, and what share he has in 
the evolution of his destiny. We begin neither on the side 
of the Optimist nor the Pessimist, neither with the Stoic 
nor the Epicurean. With whom we shall end depends on 
evidence which shall be forthcoming. 

As one reads treatise after treatise on the subject of 
ethics, he feels that [the writers are, after all, consciously 
or unconsciously, striving to answer the same question and 
that question is: How may Human Welfare be Advanced? 
It does not matter that the real questionis lost sight of in 
the midst ofmetaplrpsicaland psychological meanderings. 
It is ever present, like the theme in a technical musical com- 



2 Cf. W. Wallace, Lectures aud Essays, pages 250 and 251. 



'A Eleafor Hedonism. 8 

position. Metaphysical, psychological-, and phygiological 
discussions interest us, because^ we* nope that they will 
throw some light on the ultimate .question of human 
welfare and human destiny. 

Ethics, is then, essentiaflyva science of man, his wel-. 
fare and his destiny. If ethics puts to itself the question, 
why should this thing be done, and that omitted, it is 
because the former tends to promote human welfare, 
while the latter would retard or prevent it. 

But the term welfare is a broad, abstract term, 
about whose content and meaning there maybe difference 
of opinion. Welfare is equivalent to doiog or faring well. 
But what is "well"? The ethical problem, then, is 
merely stated when reduced to terms of human welfare. 
Before we can decide finally what is "well" for a man or for 
the human race, we should know something of the origin 
and nature of the individual and the race. We ought to 
know the place of man the individual, and man the species 
in the universe. From the standpoint of Hedonism, the 
problem of human conduct cannot receive a final solution 
till we are aware of every fact which can affect the conse- 
quences of human activity. But at the seme' time, the 
Hedonist insists on our making the best of such facts as 
are available. Because we are not aware of all the conse- 
quences of our acts, we are by no means justified in 
neglecting such consequences as are now familiar. Uncer- 
tainty as to the ultimate purpose or destiny of the race 
should not diminish my interest in my own personal 
destiny and welfare. 

Prior to the nineteenth century, ignorance of man's 
nature and origin and his relation to the rest of the uni- 
verse greatly hindered any intelligent answer to the ques- 
tion as to his place and function in the universe at large. 
So long as each individual was looked upon as a special 
piece of workmanship, shaped according to a set pattern, 
like a statue or a piano, it was impossible to arrive at a 
correct idea of man's place in Nature. But when the doc- 
trine of evolution made it possible to study man as a 
growth, a mind among minds, an animal among animals 
and a living organism among living organisms, subject 



4 A Plea for Hedonism. 

to definite laws and principles, his present character and 
future possibilities became a matter of supremest interest. 
When we apply the doctrine of natural selection to man, 
every trait of character and shade of temperament is 
pregnant with meaning; every institution, past or pre- 
sent, is worthy of study as having been a help or hindrance 
to human progress. But in our study of man and his en- 
viroment, we must not forget an important distinction, 
which is frequently overlooked. Nature, so far as 
we can learn, is the product of a single system of 
forces, working apparently according to a harmonious 
plan. (Whether nature is the product of mere chance, of 
preordained pupose, or of other Power, this is not the 
place to inquire. ) Man, on the other hand, according to 
our previous assumption, is a center of force within a 
force, a plan within a plan. His evolution is the combin- 
ed product of nature and his own intelligence, and the 
share of each of these forces, in the product-, is at this 
moment a warmly disputed question, as the recent works 
of such men as Benjamin Kidd, A. E. Taylor, and others 
bear evidence. I shall have more to say on the subject in a 
later part of this essay; at present it will suffice to say 
that in my opinion the part played by intelligence in the 
development of man and human institutions has been 
much larger than evolutionary philosophers are inclined 
to admit. Most of our ethical concepts and beliefs, it 
seems to me, are the result of the perception or the sup- 
posed perceptions of the consequences of actions. Even 
our ethical emotions are to a. considerable extent, altho 
by no means altogether, the product of individual and 
racial experience. By means of intelligence and its in- 
strument, language, the individual and the society of to- 
day are the heirs of a rich estate in experience. Our con- 
cepts and beliefs have come down to us like precious heir- 
looms, well tested and ready for use; not, however, thro' 
inherited brain and nerve tissue, but by example, train- 
ing, custom, institutions, and word of mouth. This view, 
I am well aware, is in opposition both to those of the in- 
tuitionists, led by such men as James Martineau and 
Henry 6alderwood, on the one hand, and to those of the 



A Plea for Hedonism. 5 

evolutionists, led by Herbert Speneer, A. Sutherland, 
and Leslie Stephen, on the other. 

The intuitionists go too far in making our ethical 
emotions, concepts, and beliefs, purely innate or intuitive, 
and hence inexplicable, and not to be tampered with. On 
the other hand, the evolutionists go too far in trying to 
explain the origin of all our emotions, concepts and 
beliefs by means of evolution alone. While we all admit o 
that the civilized man of today is somewhat superior to 
the savage of six thousand years ago in ethical emotions, 
yet when we reflect, on the one hand, on the immense prog- 
ress in emotional and ethical development which the negro 
has undergone during the three hundred years of his sojourn 
in America, and on the other hand on the fact that the 
child of refined parents, thrown by chance among savages 
(a very common occurrence in colonial days in America) 
exhibits no higher ethical emotions, concepts and beliefs 
than his savage fellows, we are forced to the conclusion 
that most of the ethical emotions, concepts and beliefs are 
institutional in origin, that is, the results of the accumu- 
lated experience of the race, gathered and transmitted in 
maxims, proverbs, institutions and even in the very 
words of the language itself. Suppose, for instance, that 
a million infants were selected from the most 
refined homes in the world and transported to a deserted 
island unfrequented by men, and sustained by ravens 
until they were old enough to care for themselves; is it 
not almost certain that the children would in time become 
the most degraded savages? Indeed, unless the island 
were entirely free from noxious animals and poisonous 
plants, it is very probable that the whole colony would 
perish in a very few years. Be this as it may, I cannot 
conceive that the rapid development of ethical concepts 
in western Europe within the last few centuries could be 
the result of so slow a progress as evolution. Leslie 
Stephen, in his English Utilitarians, remarks "the sudden 
awakening of the public conscience" 3 in England on the 
slave trade just prior to the French Revolution. Before 

3 The Eng. Util. Vol. I, page 1 13-14. 



6 A Plea for Hedonism. 

that awakening, the most respectable people engaged in 
the trade without a qualm of conscience. The generation 
which is just passing in America can recall a like awaken- 
ing hereon the slave question. Even the time which has 
elapsed since the days of Socrates, Plato, and Ariostotle 
is not sufficient to account for the marked advance on 
Grecian ethical concepts which is so strikingly depicted 
in T. H. Green's Prolegomena to Ethics. Much less could 
the slow progress of mental evolution account for the 
wonderful changes in ethical concepts which A. Suther- 
land has so masterfully pictured in his Origin and Growth 
of the Moral Instinct. But when we note the strides 
which the sciences have made since the days of Socrates, 
and particularly within the last three centuries, when we 
recall the progress of the arts and of our knowledge of all 
that relates to man's physical and social well-being, we need 
not be surprised at the rapid changes which have taken place 
in men's ethical notions. And when we refleet upon the 
force of habit, the strength of custom, the tenacity of inher- 
ited beliefs, and the universal ignorance of the ultimate 
foundation of institutions in general, we can only be sur- 
prised that opinions have yielded as rapidly as they have 
to the wave of progress 4 . But if the evolutionists have in 
their zeal gone too far in ascribing the whole of man's prog- 
ress to the power of evolution, they have, until the last few 
years, failed to emphasize sufficiently the importance of 
the part which nature plays in developing the anti-selfish 
or altruistic emotions. So far as I know, Benjamin Kidd, 
in his social evolution, was the first to call attention to 
this remarkable fact. I shall discuss the subject. 
At present I need only say that I regard this peculiar fact, 
that nature develops the race in opposition to the indi- 
vidual's development of himself, as one of the greatest 
marvels in science and at the same time the solution of 
the apparent contradiction which runs all through human 
life and activity. I believe it offers the only solution of 
the ethical problem, the only basis for harmonizing con- 
flicting ethical theories. In this brief essay I can do no 

*See I<eslie Stephen, the Kng. Util. Vol. I, page 5. 



A Plea for Hedonism. f 

more than blase a lew trees along the rojate, leaving 
to others the work of clearing a broad highway. 

II. THE CRITERION OF CONDUCT. 

1. Evolution and Ethics. 

As I stated in the preliminary section, ethics was still 
in need of an element in the form of evolution, before it 
could give a satisfactory .and rational account of human 
activity and conduct. So long as human instincts and 
human prejudices had to be accepted as inexplicable facts, 
it was impossible to distinguish instinctive and impulsive 
activity from voluntary conduct. No one could gainsay 
the arguments of the intuitionist, no matter how absurd 
his pretensions might be. The claim of the Morman and 
Mohammedan of the right to enjoy more than one wife, 
the claim of the cannibal to eat his enemy, and the claim 
of the hermit to the right to live an isolated life were 
equally unassailable. But since evolution has pointed 
out the probable origin and the growth of not only 
nearly every human institution, but of the very moral 
sentiments themselves, intuitionism is, in the words of 
Professor Muirhead, "entirely out of court." 6 The ideas 
of law and gradual development throw a new light on 
every phase of human nature and human institutions. 
According to the doctrine of evolution, the individual 
man, as well as man the species, is the product of a 
gradual development; and this development is largely 
by means of natural selection through the survival of the 
fittest in the struggle for existence. When the facts of the 
struggle for existence are first presented to us, they are 
apt to produce quite a shock to our moral feelings. The 
amount of suffering involved in the process is simply 
inconceivable and inexplicable. It was these facts that J. 
S. Mill had in mind when he wrote his scathing essay on 
Nature. The startling and yet unquestionable details 
given in the first few chapters of Sutherland's Origin and 
Growth of the Moral Instinct show conclusively that 
nature does not have much regard for the individual. 

6 Elements of Ethics, p. 134. 



8 A Plea for Hedonism. 

She is apparenty Working for the benefit of fhe race, and 
seems utterly indifferent bo the sufferings and destruction 
of individuals. If we were permitted to judge nature 
from the human standpoint, it might be pretty hard to 
determine whether she is benevolent or malevolent. 6 But 
the ultimate purpose of conscious existence is still a 
mystery to us, unless we accept revealed religion. The 
problem of evil is no nearer solution than in the days of 
Job. It is the Pons Asmorum of theological ethics. We 
have no right, therefore, to judge nature by human 
standards. It is evidect, however, that nature is gradu- 
ally developing higher (in the sense of more complex) 
forms of animal life; and in man, the highest animal, of 
sentient intelligence. But the individual is short-lived, 
while the race continues. Consequently, one of tne most 
difficult problems of eth'es is the question: What interest 
has the individual in the persistence of the race? It is 
evident that Hedonism has no object in evading facts or 
denying the truth. It frankly admits, therefore, that at 
present the interest of the individual and that of society 
at large do not, so far as we can judge, exactly tally or 
correspond. 7 That the time will come to which Herbert 
Spencer looks forward, in which society will be in such 
perfect equilibrium that each individual will find his 
own greatest good in working for the greatest good of all 
other men is a possibility, an ideal at which the wise 
hedonist will aim as a final goal. But in the meantime, 
the individual, as the body politic, must have rules of 
action. We must not prepare our vehicles for the smooth 
tableland of human perfection till we have scaled the 
mountains of human frailty, ignorance and error. So 
far as social welfare coincides with individual welfare the 
question presents no difficulties. And as we show else- 
where, the margin of conflict is at present very narrow 
and tends gradually to disappear. Hadley says, 8 "Rat- 

6 See Paulsen, Introd. to Phil., p. 153. 

7 See B. Kidd, Western Civilization, Chap. II, 1; Stephen, Science of 
Chap. VII; Spencer, Data of Ethics, Chap. 12. 
8 Economics, p. 14. 



A Plea for Hedonism. 9 

ional egotism and rational altruism tend to coincide." 
But a margin of conflict there undoubtedly is at present. 
And if the race is to be maintained, nature must some- 
how win the day and compel the individual to act against 
his own interest and in favor of the social interest. This, 
as I show later, she does by means of the instincts and 
emotions. Mr. Huxley, in his lecture on Evolution and 
Ethics, insists that the "ethical process" and the "evolu- 
tionary process" are in- direct conflict. Benevolence, al- 
truistic conduct and sympathy are, according to him, in 
direct contravention to the struggle for existence, which 
is the evolutionary process. But I am forced to disagree 
with him. (Huxley makes a recantation in the appendix 
to this lecture. ) The social instincts are direct products 
of evolution. And so far as disinterested activity, so 
called, rests on a religious sanction, it is not really dis- 
interested, as I showed above. 

The practical difficulty raised by Nietzsche and his 
followers is much more serious. Are we to let the sympa- 
thetic impulses act to the extent of reversing the work of 
evolution and preventing the survival of the fittest? 
Our institutions for preserving the weak, the defective, 
and the degenerate certainly make the question of serious 
importance, especially as the religious and ethical 
opinions of the present day tend to encourage the senti- 
ment in favor of the preservation of the classes which 
would otherwise perish. 9 Taylor points out the difficulty 
referred to above and calls it the "Paradox of Benevo- 
lence." (See below the problem of altruism.) The only 
answer which Hedonism can give, aside from one based 
on religious doctrines, is that nature must solve the 
question for herself. Our sentiments for the weak may be 
illogical, but they are facts; and Hedonism sticks to the 
facts of human nature. Nor does it seem possible to 
reason ourselves away from these sentiments, even if we 
disregard religion. Huxley insists as strongly on the 
validity of the ethical process as do Benjamin Kidd and 
Dr. Martineau. 

9 See E. A. Taylor, Prob. of Conduct, p. 272 et seq. 



10 A Plea for Hedonism. 

But while the Hedonist admits that social welfare 
and individual welfare do not precisely tally, he denies 
that there is any serious decrepancy between them even 
at present. The apparent discrepancies are largely due to 
our ignorance either of the real welfare of the society or 
that of the individual. Only too often in the past, the 
welfare of the individual has been sacrificed to the sup- 
posed welfare of the state. So wise a philospher as Aris- 
totle, for example, seemed to think that slavery is a part 
of the plan of nature. He did not think that slaves could 
be dispensed with until shuttles ceased to be thrown. 
Nearly every nation, past and present, has put more 
or less restraint upon the women. Yet those nations 
which have put confidence in her find that most, if not all, 
the restraints of the past were uncalled for. Perhaps in 
no distant age the enforced military service of today will 
seem as barbarous to those nations that still practice it 
as the crudities of the feudal system now seems to expert 
political scientists. On the other hand, the welfare of the 
state has been at times as clearly sacrificed to the 
supposed rights of the individual. For example, when the 
individual was allowed to be lord of his own domain to 
the extent of making it a place for germs of disease to 
grow and spread; or when each parent was left to educate 
or not educate his children as he saw fit; or when favored 
individuals were allowed to monopolize the land, water, 
or other means of producing a living. 10 Only in recent 
years have the laws of social growth and decay been 
studied in a truly scientific way. And what a fund of 
information has already been brought to light. The 
works of Sohm, Mommsen and others on Roman history 
and institutions; the works of Maine, Spencer, Tyler and 
others in England, and Wundt, Waitz and others in 
Germany on the early history and institutions of man- 
kind generally; and the special works on sociology and 
social evolution of Spencer, Kidd, Lombroso and others 

i°These lines were written before the great coal strike of 1902 in 
Pennsylvania brought this particular instance strongly before the mind 
of everyone. 



A Plea tor Hedonism. 11 

demonstrate beyond anj possible doubt how small a 
share the men in the past had in their own development, 
or rather, how unconscious a share. For nature requires 
every creature to work out his own salvation. She 
neither increases nor dimishes the effects of a creature's 
own acts. She establishes the laws of progress, and those 
who conform to them will survive; the rest will perish. 
It is not my purpose, however, to show why the laws of 
nature are as they are, but rather to point out what some 
of them are. Those who wish to see nature rebuked may 
read J. S. Mill's essay on Nature, those on the other hand 
who wish to hear her praises sounded may read their 
Bridgewater Treatise, their Emerson or their Spencer. 
The Hedonist prefers to accept the laws of nature as facts 
and to spend his strength in adapting himself to those 
laws. 

This much then is certain; before man could become a 
social creature, Nature must have developed in him a 
social impulse or social pleasure strong enough to over- 
come his objections to yielding up the liberties he could 
enjoy as an independent individual. But these liberties 
could not conceivably have been either very great or very 
valuable. The primitive man had almost nothing to 
gain, and very much to lose by living alone. But as 
society gradually advances, numerically, economically, 
and otherwise, the margin of temptation to evade the 
requirements of social order would naturally increase. 
There must be a corresponding increase, therefore, in the 
social cohesiveness. Mere increase of experience and 
reasoning power would, perhaps, only increase the temp- 
tations of the individual to evade the social law. Nature 
filled the breach by preserving the individuals who were 
slightly more gifted with the social impulse or pleasure. 
Thus generation after generation, little by little nature 
built up man's sympathetic nature. Much of it she built 
up for him no doubt, before he became man at all. For 
we find the social and domestio instincts well developed in 
many of the lower animals. 11 Primitive man had still a 

"Sutherland, Origin and Growth of the Moral Instinct, Vol. I. 



12 A Plea lor Hedonism. 

vast amount of social impulse and sympathy to develop 
before he could live in large societies, under elaborate 
institutions. But this is not the place to pursue this sub- 
ject further. Those who wish to read a full discussion of 
the subject of the origin and growth of the moral instincts 
are referred to the elaborate as well as interesting work of 
Sutherland. My wish is only to show the attitude of He- 
donism toward nature and her laws. The man with whom 
ethics has £o deal is not, therefore, a purely self-centered 
being. His very constitution makes him to a greater or 
less extent ¥ interested in the welfare of his fellow beings. 
If this were not so, mankind would never have been drawn 
into group life. 

.2. The Canon of Consequences. 

Every ethical theory must sooner or later find itself 
driven to answer the question, What constitutes the 
moralty of an act? Wherein does one act differ from 
another? Why may I do this and not do that? The 
terms, "Ought," "Right," "Good," "Approval" and their 
opposites imply the existence of an answer to these ques- 
tions. Many answers may have been given to the above 
questions. One group of moralists state in effect that the 
morality of an act is something ultimate, eternal, immut- 
able and inexplicable; that right and wrong are like right 
and left, up and down, round and square. Those who 
give this answer become hopelessly confused when we ask 
them how they know what acts fall in one class and what 
in the other. The well known conflict in the actual 
judgments of men as to the classification of acts morally, 
proves conclusively that we have no sense or intuition 
which will infallibly guide us in this matter. And even if 
such a sense actually existed in each of us, we might still 
question its authority as a guide to action. I might still 
say: granted that intuition tells me this act is what you 
call right, yet why must I perform it! Thus the intuition - 
ist must at last fall back on some more ultimate reason 
for his ethical classification. This is usually done by 
saying the right act is so commanded by Grod. But this 
assertion still permits me to ask, Why must I obey the 



A Plea for Hedonism. IB 

will or command of my fellow men, or my own will? The 
only conclusive answer to this query is that God has 
power to reward me if I obey, and punish me if I 'disobey, 
and will do so. That answer gives the terms right and 
wrong and intelligible, because sentient, content.. 

Another group of moralists, at whose head is Imman- 
uel Kant, answer the ultimate ethical question by saying 
that the morality of an act is its fitness -to become a 
universal law or maxim of conduct. A moral act is one 
which we can wish anybody and everybo9y to perform. 
But it is evident that this answer is purely formal.. We 
must still experience the various consequences of the 
various kinds of acts before we can say whether we are 
willing for all men to perform them. 12 In other words," we 
must fall back on the consequences of actions. Those 
acts which benefit us we will want other men to perform. 
Those acts which pain or injure us we shall want them to 
omit. 13 

Another group of moralists argue that the morality 
of an act lies in its tendency to promote the perfection of 
an action. But the term ''perfection" is empty until we 
have formed an idea of perfection. Perfection relates 
rather to the means than to the end. 14 The means are 
perfect when they are best adapted to accomplish the 
given design or purpose. Perhaps we are not yet pre- 
pared to define the perfect man; but a tentative definition 
must certainly include his sentient nature, that is, his 
capacity to suffer and enjoy; the perfect man will be least 
subject to pain and best equipped for enjoyment. Those, 
such as Dr. Paul Carus, 15 who make work the ideal of 
conduct overlook the fact that work is a means, not an 
end. I, as a free creature, live, keep healthly, and work, 
for the sake of carrying out my ideal. The work, the life, 
and the health themselves I care nothing about. It is the 
fullest sentient consciousness that I desire; and because 



12 See Caird, Crit. Philos. of Kant, II. p. 290. 
"Taylor, op. cit.,p. 351. 

Alexander, Moral Order ami Progress, p. 190. 
^The HI Weal Problem, 2m3 ed. 



14 A Plea tor Hedonism. 

life, health and work make this possible, I care for them as 
means. 16 Experience reveals to us the laws of cause and 
effeet, the unity of Nature and the conservation of force. 
The whole universe, so far as we know it, is subject to 
universal laws. Man, along with his fellow animals, 
has been developed from lower creatures by means of the 
natural selection of advantageous variations in form and 
character (together with other forces yet unknown, no 
doubt). After the appearance of intelligence and volition, 
animals have some share in the shaping of their own lives. 
Man has far outstriped his fellow animals in intelligence, 
as to memory, power of attention, observation, associa- 
tion of ideas and reason. With the dawn of reason, man 
began to observe the consequences of his actions. Those 
actions which conduced to his pleasure or preservation, 
and especially to the latter, were repeated. Those men 
who were luckiest in hitting upon the most preservative 
acts succeeded in the race for existence, (or rather persis- 
tence) while their less fortunate neighbors perished. 
As intelligence continued to develop, men began to study 
the consequences of their actions with more care. In time 
certain consequences became so well known that every 
man knew how to bring them about and they were 
accepted as a matter of course. But there was always a 
margin, and a large margin of acts the utility of whose 
consequences was disputed. Men could not agree as to 
whether these acts should be done or not. This was 
especially true of acts whose consequences were complex 
or remote. But whenever the consequences, (that is, the 
aggressive or approximately total consequences) of an 
act were well known or supposed to be known, men gener- 
ally agreed as to its morality, that is, as to whether it 
should be done or omitted. The desired consequences 
have usually been the escape from bodily or mental pain, 
from disease, suffering and torment, in this life and the 
next, as might be within reach. A study of the actual 
systems of morality and the actual desires, fears, hopes 
and ambitions of men, past and present, will, I believe, 

l6 Taylor, Problem of Conduct, p. 333, 



A Plea tor Hedonism, 10 

show the correctness of this analysis. The consequences 
of an act, in terms of pleasure and pain, are and must be 
the ultimate criterion of its morality or permissibility. 
Any other criterion must, sooner or later, resolve itself 
into this one. Every formal criterion of activity must 
have a content of sentience before it is of any practical 
value. A sentient consciousness is never satisfied with a 
formal answer to the query, Why must I do this? But 
an answer in terms of pleasure and pain gives immediate 
and complete satisfaction. When I direct an intelligent 
creature not to do a thing because the consequences of 
doing it are thus and so, he can determine for himself 
whether I have pointed out a sufficient sanction for the law 
I have asserted. I trespass neither on his freedom of 
judgment nor on his freedom of action. The law is not 
categorical or imperative. It is disjunctive. Each person 
may determine for himself whether to accept or reject the 
consequences of an act. 

This Hedonism, which is based on the canon of conse- 
quences, is the only logical doctrine of ethics. 

3. The Province of Intelligence. 

One more point and I shall have finished the outline 
of what I regard as the essentials of Hedonism. I have 
pointed out that most of the human suffering and error 
of the past was the result of ignorance and imperfection. 
We have further seen that even the well-meant efforts of 
men acting together in society to better their condition 
have very often produced the reverse of the intended 
effects. The question will now occur: Would it not be 
better to abandon ourselves entirely to the care of nature, 
and not attempt to guide men by human laws and 
human institutions? More than one leading thinker has 
advocated such a course. Long before any one thought 
of applying the laws of evolution to the growth of 
society, Kousseau proposed that men should go back to a 
state of nature. Many of the leading economists of the 
last century advocated to some extent a similar view in 
their "laissez faire" doctrine. Even Herbert Spencer and 
his followers take the same position, apparently, at times 



16 A Plea for Hedonism* 

when denouncing the legislation of the past and present. 
But after all, men's disposition to form these institutions 
is also a natural disposition, arid a wise second thought 
shows us that, in spite of all bis mistakes, the man of 
today has survived by means of his institutions. Those 
tribes and races whose Jaws and institutions were anti- 
social decayed and disappeared; while those who were 
fortunate enough or wise enough to adopt beneficial insti- 
tutions and laws survived and progressed. 

The mere fact of survival shows that the peoples that 
survived had either internal or external qualities, or both 
combined, that enabled them to outstrip their com- 
petitors in the race for existence. The latter alternative 
seems the more probable: there was a combination of 
mental traits and external institutions which carried the 
victorious races to the goal. But this does not amount 
to the assertion that existing institutions cannot be 
improved upon. Other institutions might have been 
devised which would have proved infinitely superior to 
those actually adopted. Had the Athenians, for example, 
with all their intellectual keenness, their artistic insight 
and their executive ability, devised a form of federal gov- 
ernment similar to that of the United States at the 
present day, or had they even developed the genius for 
law and government which the ancient Romans mani- 
fested, no one can say to what degree of civilization they 
might have attained. Or had the Chinese in the days of 
Confucius combined with their industry, sobriety and 
inventive cleverness the flexibility of character which 
encourages change and progress, they, too, might have 
become a world power. Going still further back into the 
past, had the ancient Egyptians combined with their 
marvelous mechanical skill, their architectural talent and 
their knowledge of the sciences of geography, astronomy 
and writing the inclination to educate the whole people 
instead of a favored class, and the disposition to build 
monuments economically useful instead of pyramids and 
spynxes, they, too, might still be the leading nation of 
the world. But what has been, has been; our business is 
to study the past for the purpose of improving the future. 



A Plea for Hedonism. 1 7 

We have much to learn from the attempt of past genera- 
tions to solve the problems of conduct, both individual 
and social. And we may profit as much, if not more, by 
their mistakes than by their successes. The science of 
government is yet far from perfect; it will continue to 
present new difficulties to each succeeding generation. 
But men who can live peaceably together in societies 
aggregating from 50,000,000 to 100,000,000 are surely 
much in advance of savages who straggle about in groups 
of from ten to fifty. The institutions of the larger 
groups are, to a very great extent, based on dear-bought 
experience. They are the result of the accumulated exper- 
ience and wisdom of the past. By means of language, 
oral and written, each generation was able to start 
nearly where the preceding left off. The wisdom of the 
group is infinitely beyond that of any of the individuals 
composing it. For the division of labor and knowledge 
make it impossible as well as unnecessary and unprofit- 
able for any one man to carry all the knowledge of the 
age in his head. One must not be too positive, however, 
touching the social value of any institution. The laws of 
soeial existence and progress are so complex that we can 
only make provisional statements concerning any insti- 
tution and wait for time to demonstrate whether we are 
correct or not. The germs of destruction may be devel- 
oping in institutions which we look upon as the most 
precious. It follows, then, that both nature and intelli- 
gence must take part in the evolution of human destiny. 
Much of the work only nature can perform. But there is 
also a place for intelligence, for human reason and 
endeavor. If I had time, it would be easy to show that 
Mr. Sutherland, in his otherwise excellent book, 17 has 
committed the fault of overlooking the share of intelli- 
gence, as taught by experience, in altering human 
institutions and human ways of looking at things and 
conduct. 18 But I cannot agree with the conclusion of 
Taylor that biological evolution would not have carried 



^he Origia and Growth of Moral Instinct. 

18 See the strong statement of Taylor, Prob. of Conduct, p. 235 et seq. 



18 A Plea tor Hedonism. 

the human race beyond the agricultural stage. Nature is 
not satisfied with the mere maintenance of the race. The 
law of evolution still holds good, and those individuals 
who happen to be more sympathetic and to derive more 
pleasure from sympathetic activity will tend to survive 
the less sympathetic. Thus self-interest and social interest 
will tend, through natural selection, to become identical. 19 

It is the dawning perception of the relation of things 
that changes our opinions as to the value of conduct, and 
not, as Mr. Sutherland insists, altogether the evolution 
of sympathy in us by the secret force of nature. 20 

Whatever Hedonism may have meant, therefore, in 
the days of Aristippus and Epicurus, in the days of 
Hobbes and Locke, or even in the days of Jeremy Ben- 
tham and the two Mills, at the present day evolutionary 
Hedonism, when it is careful not to fall into the vice of 
mere mechanism, means that each of us has the right to 
the fullest realization of himself which is consistent with 
the same right on the part of other intelligent beings; 21 
that as man is not only a conscious but also a sentient, 
or pleasure-pain creature, he is entitled to the fullest 
development of his whole nature; that pleasure and 
health or welfare go hand in hand, while pain is the 
index of disorder, maladjustment, lack of equilibrium, or 
decay; that pain in itself can never be a good; at most 
it can only be the negative means of leading to something 
else as a good or end; 22 while pleasure, if not the end 
itself, is at least the inseparable accompaniment of the 
end, and in the long run the only safe criterion to the end; 
that nature (which may mean the Creator acting through 
nature if you like) takes care of intelligent creatures by 
means of instincts and impulses until their reason is 
sufficiently developed to perceive the purpose of pain and 
X>leasure in the economy of life and their knowledge suffi- 
ciently great to realize the laws of nature and their rela- 



19 See Huxley, Evolution and Ethics, Note 20, p. 114. 

^Stephen, op. cit., p. 103. 

^Spencer, Prin. Ethics, p. 46. 

22 Alexander, Moral Order, etc., p. 225. 



A Plea for Hedomism. 19 

tion to the sentient creature. Hedonism takes man as 
the partially developed product of evolution and seeks to 
show him as an individual and as a race what possibil- 
ities nature has in store for him; and if there be an after 
life, how the present life may be best lived as a prelimi- 
nary to that. Hedonism is obliged to draw upon all the 
other sciences for its material. 23 In fact all the sciences 
are but the more or less systematic efforts of man to find 
his place in the universe. 24 Among the sciences which 
Hedonism will draw most from are the sciences of the 
human body, its health and ailments, the economic 
sciences, or the sciences of satisfying man's needs, and the 
political and legal sciences, or the sciences which govern 
man's actions in society, For evolutionary Hedonism 
recognizes that man is by nature a sociable creature; 
that each tribe, nation or people, in fact, is a sort of 
organism, subject to definite laws of growth and decay. 
The welfare of the individual is, therefore, largely a func- 
tion of the organism of which he is a part; thus while a 
wise man like Socrates or Confucius might be happy 
among miserable associates he could be much happier, if 
his associates were also wiser and happier. Altruism, or 
interest in the welfare of others, is thus to a large ex- 
tent an element of Hedonism. 

III. The Strength of Hedonism. 

The chief theory of conduct which is opposed to 
Hedonism is intuitionism, the theory of duty or con- 
science. This theory looks to the human sentiments for a 
basis for activity. We are to be guided in our actions, 
not by their experienced consequences on ourselves and 
others, but by the approving or disapproving voice of 
this inward monitor. 

Without stopping to inquire at present into the 
origin and nature of this inward monitor, we find on 
investigation that it has varied enormously in different 
ages, races, localities and individuals. Thus we find that 
slavery has met with almost universal approval in times 

^%ulsen, System of Bt&fes, Introd. 
^Weber, Hist Philos., p. i. 



20 A Plea for Hedonism. 

past, being recognized in the sacred books of the Hebrews, 
Hindus, Chinese, Greeks and Egyptians, and being prac- 
ticed to a greater or less extent by all nations. At the 
present time it is condemned by nearly all civilized men. 
The subjection of women has been likewise generally 
approved and practiced. Only in the most recent times 
and among the most developed nations has woman 
begun to receive the same treatment as man. Even at 
the present day our sense of duty does not urge us to give 
her the same political and social rights that men possess. 
Custom keeps her wages lower than those of men engaged 
in precisely the same work. 25 Again, the sense of duty has 
not prevented the basest treatment and neglect of 
children, even among people who were the most scrupu- 
lous, such as the Puritans. 

Once more, the caste system prevails among a large 
proportion of mankind. The sense of duty not only does 
not require members of the higher caste to treat those of 
a lower caste as their equals, but on the contrary pos- 
tively forbids such treatment. Nor is the caste system 
by any means confined to Asia. The young woman who 
marries below her station in Europe or America loses 
caste almost as surely as does the Hindu belle. The very 
word friendship implies a broader form of selfishness. 
One is expected to do for a friend what he would not do 
for a stranger or an enemy. Our consciences call on us to 
help a friend who is in trouble; while they are not much 
stirred by the sufferings of Hindus and Chinese, unless 
their sufferings become widespread and excessive. The 
word patriotism likewise implies that our country is to 
be preferred to other countries. Even if we do not accept 
the maxim, "Our country, right or wrong," we are apt to 
be strongly biased in her favor in case of rivalry or 
conflict with other countries. 

In opposition to the above illustrations, 26 Paul Janet 
and others seek to demonstate a general uniformity of 
opinion in all ages and nations on moral questions. But 

^ee Report of Com. of L^bor, V©1. XI. 
^Theory of Morals, Bk. Ill, ch. 4, 



A Plea for Hedonism. Ml 

the cases cited by them seem to show simply that the 
universal reasoning and sentient, pleasure-pain faculties 
of mankind have led them gradually to learn the same 
facts regarding human and physical nature, and to adapt 
themselves to these facts. The activities necessary to 
maintain the individual and the race, after making the 
necessary allowances for differences in the environment, 
must be more or less similar everywhere; and if men desire 
to live in society, certain general and evident rules of con- 
duct must be established and followed. But beyond these 
apparent and fundamental cases, it seems impossible to 
harmonize the moral views of mankind. For in 
addition to the cases of conflicting consciences 
which we have already given, we have other 
cases of a much more radical kind. In the sexual re- 
lations we find differences in opinion the most remote. To 
say nothing of monogamy, polygamy and polyandry, such 
writers as Spencer, Westermark and Sutherland give 
instances of what we regard as looseness of sexual prac- 
tice, which are almost inconceivable. So in matters of 
honesty and veracity, we find that among many nations, 
honesty and veracity are not supposed to be due to a 
foreigner. Theft from a stranger and even from a neigh- 
bor was applauded not only in ancient Sparta, but in 
many other countries. And even in civilized countries 
clever dishonesty and deception are too often approved 
where the parties are very unequally situated: for 
example when one outwits and cheats an employer, a 
great corporation, or the public officers. There is often a 
feeling of approval of the clever urchin, who deceives his 
teacher. And I have heard old soldiers of high standing 
tell with evident self-satisfaction how they deceived and 
defrauded their officers, and their stories were approved 
by their audience. The most intelligent people sometimes 
will be found to distinguish between lying and deceit. 
Many a man who would suffer torture rather than lie 
verbally, will not hesitate to deceive by actions. 27 

But a closer examination shows us that the sense of 

"See H. Spencer, Ethics II, li&\ also The Outlook, Vol. 73, p. 262-3. 



22 A Plea ior Hedonism. 

duty, or conscience is exceedingly compliant and flexible. 
It gives way in nearly every instance to the accepted 
religious code. Whatever is prescribed by the accepted 
religion is approved by the sense of duty. This accounts 
for the child-murders so common among heathen tribes. 
The tribes of ancient Palestine laid their infants in the 
red-hot arms of a metallic god. The Hindu mother 
throws her babe to the crocodile and even Abraham was 
ready to sacrifice his only son at the supposed call of 
deity. But the sense of duty bends not only at the dic- 
tate of religion, but at the dictate of custom, where 
custom and religion d ) not conflict. Hence the most 
absurd costumes are worn, the most absurd rites 
observed, and the most absurd practices maintained, 
simply because custom has established them. In this case 
the sense of duty requires one to respect public opinion. 
This opinion is vastly stronger among the uncivilized 
than among ourselves. But even the best of us feel 
impelled by the sense of duty to comply with the customs 
in force around us. 

Once more, the sense of duty usually complies with the 
existing laws, in so far as they do not conflict with our 
religious beliefs. 

In any age and nation, therefore, we may expect to 
find the general conscience or sense of duty pretty clearly 
defined by the prevailing religious code, together with the 
accepted customs and political laws in force. If the relig- 
ion is false and maintains pernicious rites and doctrines, 
the sense of duty will be accordingly perverted. If the 
customs are absurd and injurious, the political laws illog- 
ical and narrow, the keener intellects will probably strive 
very gradually to modify them in the direction of 
improving the social welfare, but the sense of duty of the 
multitude will always lag far in the rear of the car of 
progress. For progress is usually the work of a select 
few; and the multitude are very slow to perceive the 
advantages of a change in well established institutions. 98 

We are forced to the conclusion, therefore, that the 

28 See Bryce, Studies in Hist, and Jurist.— Obedience, p. 463. 



A Plea wr Hedonism. 28 

sense of duty, or conscience is not a safe and sufficient 
guide to human conduct. 

The sentiments play an extremely important part in 
human affairs; but we cannot safely rely on them as the 
ultimate criterion of the rectitude of an action or course 
of conduct. What habit does for one in matters of bodily 
action, the sentiments do for him in matters of volition. 
Habit permits us to devote the mind to other matters 
while the body carries out a given line of conduct. So 
the sentiments dispense with the necessity of going back 
to first principles before deciding on every act. They are 
moral habits, nothing more. 

If, then, intuitionism, with its reliance on an inward 
monitor, is unable to provide an ultimate basis for human 
activity, a philosophy of conduct, what has Hedonism to 
offer in its stead? Wherein lies the strength of Hedonism? 
We must admit at the start that Hedonism has a bad 
name. Any doctrine which advocates selfishness must 
expect to be frowned upon. And among Christian 
peoples, at any rate, any doctrine based on pleasure must 
likewise expect to meet strong opposition. Unless, there- 
fore, the Hedonist can make out a strong and clear case 
in its favor, he must not expect any mercy at the hands 
of his opponents and critics. More than this, I realize 
only too clearly that a misunderstood theory of pleasure 
might cause a vast deal of harm. It would perhaps be 
better to let men blunder along after their old guides than 
to have them think they need no guide at all; that they 
are at liberty to do as they please, and to gratify every de- 
sire and passion as it arises. It is incumbent on the Hed- 
onist to guard by eYery possible precaution against any 
such misconception of his doctrine. Hedonism, as I under- 
stand the doctrine, seeks to establish a philosophical basis 
for conduct, not a stronghold for the libertine. It is not 
intended to work any sudden revolution in the morals 
and manners of civilized men, and this for the simple 
reason that in spite of their erroneous theories of the 
ultimate bases of conduct and of certain details of 
activity, civilized peoples have unconsciously followed 
hedonistic principles in their development. They have 



24> A Plea for Hedonism. 

builded better than they knew. The canon of conse- 
quences has been accepted and followed to some extent in 
all ages and nations, But other theories have often 
greatly retarded its application, even to the extent of 
destroying great nations. The nations which have sur- 
vived and progressed are, I believe, those which have 
grasped most firmly and applied most faithfully the canon 
of consequences. As I hive tried to point out in the first 
section, it was largely because the ancient Greeks were 
untrammelled by any religious code that they were able to 
make the freest use of the canon of consequences. Thus 
they were able to develop the most accurate and valuable 
moral theory which the world knew before the present 
age, and by its use to re;ich the highest pinnacle of civili- 
zation. I cannot agree with Mr. Spencer in his indictment 
of Greek civilization. 29 The Hindu and the Chinaman, on 
the contrary, tied themselves hand and foot with strin- 
gent religious and social codes. 

Hedonism, therefore, is evolutionary, rather than 
revolutionary. It conceives that there are vastly higher 
and broader stages of civilization yet in store for human- 
ity; but it does not hope to attain these by any sudden 
leap. It will have done enough if it enables the car of 
civilization to move steadily onward and Upward. 

Yet at the present time, when the ethical problem, 
that is, the question as to the ultimate foundation of 
moral conduct, is studied and discussed as it never was 
before, it seems well worth while to help all one can in 
reaching a solution of tne problem. 

In the first place, then, Hedonism is irreconcilably 
opposed to every form of asceticism, that is, to pain for 
the sake of pain. Nearly all the religious and ethical 
systems of the past have been vitiated by the taint of 
asceticism. This is not the place to inquire into the 
origin of the monstrous notion that the Deity could take 
delight in the sufferings of his creatures. It is sufficient 
for our purpose to call attention to the important place 
which this belief occupies in most religious systems. The 

^Ethics, II, I 58. 



A Plea for Hedonism. 25 

refrgious and ethical systems of western Asia and Europe 
seem to have drawn their ascetic element from Egypt, 
where, according to Schaff, 30 a pessimistic atmosphere 
seems always to have prevailed. Christianity has not 
escaped the taint. In spite of the humane teachings of 
Jesus, the Egyptian influence was strong enough to fill 
the symbols of the church with ascetic doctrines and all 
Europe with monks and monasteries. 

Hedonism insists that men have a right to be happy, 
that pain is intended to benefit and not to torture, that 
the religious or ethical doetrine demanding suffering or 
sacrifice that does not result in a greater compensating 
good to the sufferer or some other sentient creature, is 
oertainly erroneous. 

Asceticism is unreasonable and cannot justify itself. 
Yet the ascetic element in various guises is really what 
makes most other ethical systems different from Hedonism. 
Thus it is this element of asceticism which, sometimes 
drawing strength from the doctrine of self-discipline or 
stoicism, constitutes the essence of all the doctrines of 
despair, such as Buddhism. The ethics of despair may be 
hedonistic if it avoids this ascetic element. For if the 
powers of evil really are stronger in the universe, then 
doubtless we are justified in seeking Nirvana or some 
other escape into non-existence. But we are still at 
liberty to reinvestigate the facts of nature for the pur- 
pose of deciding whether existence is on the whole (500 
painful to be endurable. There was but little of the 
ascetic element in the stoicism of Greece and Rome. But 
when the current of orientalism struck the philosophy of 
Greece, the ascetic element mingled with the philosophic 
and pain for the sake of pain became a prominent element 
in the ethical doctrines of the middle ages. 

Preserved by the religious orders against the strong 
reaction of German common sense which swept over 
western Europe with the spread of German civilization, 
asceticism sprang again into prominence at the reforma- 
tion in the Puritanism of England and Germany. During 

^Church History. 



26 A Plea tor Hedonism. 

the last three centuries men have been gradually elimi- 
nating the ascetic element from the religious and ethical 
systems of Europe. The reaction probably reached flood 
tide in the.days of William Paley and Jeremy Bentham. 
Since their day there has been a slight disposition to 
revert toward asceticism, owing partly to the writings of 
Thomas Carlyle and partly to disappointment of the 
hopes placed in the political and social reforms of the 
nineteenth century. 

Asceticism draws a certain amount of strength from 
the evident value of self-discipline. But asceticism, or 
pain for its own sake, and self-discipline, or pain for the 
sake of compensating good to self or others are radically 
different. Self-discipline is a hedonistic doctrine. Exper- 
ience teaches the value of discipline as clearly as it teaches 
the absurdity of asceticism. But too often the one is 
taken for the other. Suffering to produce good for 
another is confused with suffering that another is sup- 
posed to enjoy as suffering. It is a curious fact in nature 
that sentient creatures are unquestionably able to enjoy 
the agony of their fellow creatures. By a natural infer- 
ence, one's deity is supposed to possess this same abnor- 
mal characteristic. But of all illogical and abhorrent 
emotions, this one seems to be unquestionably the worst. 
Hedonism insists that no being, be he creator or creature, 
has the right to enjoy the pain of another. 

Whatever destiny the powers of the universe have in 
store for me, I have certainly the right, in so far as I have 
the power, to make that destiny as little painful and as 
fully pleasant as possible. And the same right which I 
insist upon for myself, I insist upon with equal emphasis 
for my fellowmen. 

In the next place, Hedonism is the natural doctrine of 
conduct. All sentient creatures seek pleasure and avoid 
pain as naturally and as certainly as water seeks its level. 
Indeed, the tendency to seek pleasure and avoid pain is so 
strong and natural that an opposite doctrine seems 
almost inconceivable. Hence not only many philosophers 
but even whole nations, as the Hindus, believe that sen- 
tience and activity are inseparably connected by the law of 



A Plea for Hedonism. 27 

cause and effect. But without admitting this extreme view, 
we must concede a natural disposition or tendency in all 
conscious beings to seek pleasure and avoid pain. More- 
over, science seems to indicate that pleasure and pain are 
teleological, that is, they play an important part in the pres- 
ervation and evolution of both the individual and the 
race. No one will deny that without the faculties of 
pleasure and pain no living creature could maintain its 
existence very long. Sentience, or pleasure-pain is the 
faculty which enables a living creature to maintain the 
equilibrium with its environment which is essential 
to life. And pleasure, usually, if not always indicates 
that the equilibrium is satisfactory, while pain, 
usually, if not always, indicates that something 
is wrong. If one were disposed to argue, therefore, 
that man is the creation of an intelligent being, the exis- 
tence of these wise provisions for his persistence among the 
struggling forces of the universe would certainly be a 
strong point in his favor. But whether the gift of an 
intelligent Creator, or the product of chance, pleasure and 
pain are certainly indispensible faculties of all sentient 
creatures. And even if we can never demonstrate that 
conscious existence was intended to be as pleasant as poss- 
ible, or that the individual may strive to make it as 
pleasant as possible, we are at least certain that without 
the pleasure-pain apparatus, conscious creatures could 
not subsist at all. Pleasure being, then, such an insepar- 
able accompaniment of healthy, normal consciousness, 
and pain as clearly the index of the abnormal and defec- 
tive, is not the burden on the opponents of Hedonism to 
show that sentience should not be taken as the ultimate 
guide to conduct? As we have repeatedly indicated 
above, sentience alone would not be a sufficient guide to 
conduct, from the fact that man is an exceedingly com- 
plex being, full of conflicting desires and emotions. 
Reason, therefore, must stand as judge among the pleas- 
ure-pains and determine which are entitled to recognition 
as components of the sum total of pleasurable conscious- 
ness and which should be rejected as injurious to the 
sentient community. 



28 A Plea tor Hedonism. 

To the question: Why has Hedonism a bad name? 
we answer: Because men see that the pleasure seeker so 
often comes to grief and makes himself and others miser- 
able. Ignorance and folly too often misguide men in the 
search for happiness. Hence the advocate of Hedonism 
cannot repeat too frequently that sentience alone cannot 
be relied upon as a guide to conduct. But neither must 
this statement be misconstrued or misquoted. For after 
all, reason must rely on sentience as the test. But it is the 
course of sentience, the sum of pleasures or whatever one 
may call the total make-up and summary of a complete 
conscious existence, considering both its quality, or 
breadth, its intensity or depth and its duration or length 
which reason must direct and govern. The reader will see 
the difficulty of translating sentient ideas into terms of 
space and quantity. Yet I doubt not that he will under- 
stand what I mean. Another reason for this ill-repute of 
Hedonism is the fact that it is often mistakenly supposed 
to be opposed to self-restraint and self-discipline. But 
philosophic Hedonism, as we have said again and again, is 
in the fullest accord with all legitimate self-discipline. 
If we always remember therefore that the aim and end of 
Hedonism is to secure the richest, fullest, deepest, purest, 
longest, pleasant consciousness for the individual, we 
shall not be confused or misled by instances of blind and 
foolish pleasure-seeking, with their calamitous and repul- 
sive results nor by any unfair comparisons with self-dis- 
ciplining ethical regimes. Every sentient creature desires 
pleasure, or happiness as well as escape from pain and 
evil. Hedonism endeavors to help him obtain these 
results in the fullest degree, it may be by self-restraint or 
it may be by self-culture or indulgence. It does not tell 
men: You must do thus and so; it simply says: If you 
wish a given result you may obtain it in a certain way. 
The man who breaks the law of hedonism will call himself 
a fool. And most men would rather be anything else 
than fools. 

Hedonism, then, is the only natural ethics, the only 
ethics which seeks to lead and guide men rather than 
drive them, the only ethics which appeals to both their 



A Plea, tor Hedonism. 29 

emotions and their reason, their whole nature, instead of 
commanding and compelling them. 

But man is by nature a social creature*. He prefers 
with the ant and many higher animals to live in groups. 
And the greater his development and intelligence the 
larger become the groups in which he lives. But group- 
life, or social-life is only possible under certain conditions 
and only enjoyable to those endowed with the social or 
sympathetic emotions. The individual must consent to 
give up certain pleasures and liberties, must submit to 
certain rules and restraints. I care not whether you pre- 
fer Hobbes' theory of the Original State of War, which 
drove reasonable men into society as the lesser of two 
evils, or Kousseau's theory of the Social Contract, entered 
into by mutual consent for the sake of its advantages, or 
the theory of a divinely instituted state with the place of 
each member eternally fixed for him, or the theory of a 
state slowly evolved by natural processes. The result is 
the same in the end. Social life means the yielding up of 
certain liberties and pleasures by the individual which he 
might enjoy if he lived alone, and the acquisition of cer- 
tain joys and comforts which the anchorite must forego. 

Hedonism can be applied to several of these political 
theories. But in any given society the thoughtful indivi- 
dual submits to the social law, be it political, economical 
or etiquetical, because the advantages to himself of such 
submission are greater than the disadvantages. I am 
aware that the multitude submit to social rules largely 
from the force of habit, indolence, reverence, fear and 
affection. 31 But even the most ignorant man has a vague 
idea of the reasons for social laws. The most stupid man 
has an occasional brilliant idea, and the ferment of ideas 
in the multitude will in time seize upon the beneficial 
social principles and throw out the defective ones, much 
as the fermentation of cider throws extraneous matter to 
the top of the cask. The popular wisdom is thus not 



3: See Bryce, Studies, etc., IX Obedience, and X, The Nature of 
Sovereignty. 



SO A Plea for Hedonism. 

entirely to be despised, especially among a progressive 
people. 

Hedonism, then, is the logical basis of all prudent 
conduct, whether in the pursuit of knowledge, of health 
and comfort, of family affairs, of friendly intercourse 
with our neighbors, of art and culture, or in the greater 
intercourse which makes up the nation and the family of 
nations. There can never be any conflict between Hedon- 
ism and the sciences and arts. All the sciences and arts 
are the hand-maidens of Hedonism. Whatever makes 
men wiser, stronger, healthier, richer, more industrious, 
more friendly, more practical and enduring, better trained 
and educated for the struggle with nature, their environ- 
ment and their own character will be welcomed by the 
hedonist. Whatever on the other hand, makes men 
ignorant, weak, sickly, poor, lazy, ill-natured, stupid, 
boorish, narrow, mean, unfriendly, harsh, reckless or in 
any other way retards progress and enlightenment is 
condemned by Hedonism. Nor is there anything incon- 
sistent in this position. In case of the drunkard and the 
opium fiend, everybody can see the folly of his course of 
action. But in these other cases of a narrow selfishness 
or willfulness, the perversity and disadvantage of the 
course is only not so apparent. Every man desires health 
and strength, vigor and skill. If men disregard the laws 
of health, therefore, it is either through ignorance or 
though a weakness of the will brought on by various 
causes. Even while indulging the craving for drink or for 
morphine the drunkard does not cease to regret the prob- 
ably ultimate results of his folly. It is the business of 
Hedonism to persuade men to discipline themselves not 
for the sake of discipline, nor to gratify the whim of a 
superior, but for their own good and greater pleasure in 
the end. 

If every man has an equal right to seek happiness in 
his own way, certain logical results follow which it is 
important to consider in this place. In the first place, it 
follows that in one sense might makes right. A man may 
do what he likes and what he can. But other men may 



A Plea for Hedonism. 31 

do the same; and it follows that by combination the 
superior number may restrain the inferior. But if we 
were to stop here Hedonism would be the most pernicious 
of all doctrines. We hasten to add, therefore, with the 
apostle, that all things are not expedient. What one 
may do, and what, all things considered, he will prefer to 
do are very different. Thus, it is in my power to destroy 
my furniture, to mistreat my dog and my child, to be 
harsh with my wife and surly with my friends; but exper- 
ience teaches me that these things are not expedient. 
And if my nature has been properly developed, they are 
undesirable and repugnant to me. Kindness, affection 
and friendliness pay better in the long run. Hedonism 
urges men, therefore, to the most careful study of the 
whole situation. Right is not what one is able to do, but 
rather what one who is normally developed prefers to do 
and must do to attain his greatest welfare, that is, his 
fullest sentient consciousness. 

It also follows from the principle of the equal right of 
all to strive for their own greatest good, that each man 
may join in the restraint of his fellow-men where their 
actions interfere with his welfare. But this doctrine is 
also likely to be misunderstood. As stated above, it is an 
empty formula. The individual should still inquire into 
ultimate results. Such an inquiry, the Hedonist claims, 
will show that the welfare of the normal individual is 
nearly always identical with that of the group. Admit- 
ting that there are rare cases where social welfare and 
individual welfare appear not to coincide as the world and 
the individual are now made up, yet the hedonist insists 
that in the long run the good of the state and that of the 
individual are identical. Thus utilitarianism is a branch 
of Hedonism. For in striving for the greatest good of the 
greatest number (the formula of utilitarianism), the 
individual feels sure that indirectly he is promoting his 
own welfare. 

It will readily be seen from what has already been 
said that Hedonism is not only superior to other ethical 
systems in its appeal to men's natural inclinations and 



32 A Plea for Hedonism, 

emotions, but that it has the advantage of appealing to 
their reason and experience as well, and is thus the only 
progressive ethics. A moral system which rests on men's 
sentiments, on custom or on some vague metaphysical prin- 
ciple, such as the doctrine of the everlasting and immut- 
able right, tends to become more and more rigid and 
stationary. Thus the Hindus, with their complicated Brah- 
minical law, are shut off from all opportunity of advance 
in civilization. The Chinese, likewise, with the Confucian 
doctrines and customary morality have been stationary 
in civilization for two thousand years. The ancient Jew, 
through a misinterpretation of the Mosaic law, or a 
defect in that law, w T as excluded from all progress in art 
and culture. So during the middle ages theological ethics 
hindered the progress of art, science and commerce in end- 
less ways. Who can say how much higher civilization 
would be now if women had enjoyed the same freedom 
since the beginning of the christian era that they enjoy in 
America today? 

These instances will show the importance of having a 
moral principle which encourages instead of retarding 
science and culture. That other moral theories have con- 
structed lofty ideals, the hedonist is ready enough to 
admit. Buddha, Confucius, Zarathustra, and Kant were 
all high-minded and noble men. But in so far as they 
based their moral systems on false principles, they were 
the means of retarding rather than improving the condi- 
tion of the people. 

Buddhism is rich in noble maxims of conduct. But as 
a whole it is probably worse that no system at all. 
Zarathustra and Confucius taught many wholesome doc- 
trines, but taken as a whole, their systems have retarded 
civilization. 

So the formalism of Kant might be safe enough in an 
age where each of the virtues had a well settled, practical 
meaning for the individual; and where the duty to 
parents, to children, to neighbors and to the state were 
well recognized. But the fact that they were settled 
would make change all the more difficult if any formal 
theory of ethics were adopted. "So act that the maxim 



A Plea iov Hedonism. 33 

of your conduct may be adopted as a universal law" 
becomes dangerous among a people who are settled 
in their customs. For, as was pointed out above, the 
sentiments of the individual are almost certain to 
approve the existing regime. And when a more vigorous 
thinker appears, who sees the injurious effects in terms of 
welfare, of existing practices, he meets with universal 
opposition from all the advocates of formalism. 

In the next place, we notice that Hedonism is not only 
the natural, logical and progressive ethics. We find that 
it has been the actual element of value in all the great 
ethical systems of the past. From the very awakening 
of intelligence, sentient, conscious beings must have 
begun to study the consequences of actions, along with 
the laws of nature and of the human constitution. 
Conduct which is guided by consequences is called 
prudent. Most conduct of this kind has become so much 
a matter of course that we have long since ceased to 
think of it as having any ethical quality whatever. And 
it is very common for moralists to exclude all prudent 
activity from the field of ethics, or at the most to give 
it but a passing glance. Thus Kant insists repeatedly 
that all conduct which is induced by prudence or self- 
interest must be excluded from the field of ethics. Me 
would investigate the field of disinterested or altruistic 
conduct alone. But the hedonist maintains not only 
that prudent activity is a very important branch of 
ethics but that in the actual systems of the past, prudence 
has been the vital element. Thus every moral maxim 
which appeals to one's judgment of value must be classed 
as hedonistic. When Jesus said: "Come unto me, all ye 
that labor and are heavy laden, and I will give you rest", 
he was appealing to the sentient nature of mankind. So 
when he said, "He that believeth on me shall be saved; 
and he that believeth not shall be damned". So, when he 
said, "In my father's house are many mansions". So 
the whole sermon on the mount, his most complete dis- 
course, is entirely hedonistic. 83 For even after command- 

32 See Matth, V; 3: VII; 27. 



84 A Plea for Hedonism. 

ing the most complete systems of non-resistance and 
altruism which has ever been known 33 he adds in verse 45, 
"That ye may be the children of your Father which is in 
heaven". The sermon opens with the blessings which are 
to fall on those who accept and follow the doctrines of the 
sermon. And then it closes 34 with the remarkable parable 
of the wise man who built his house upon a rock and the 
foolish man who built on the sand. Wisdom and folly 
are the watchwords of Hedonism. Whether we hold that 
accepting the doctrines of Jesus makes a man happier or 
not in this life, there is no question that Jesus meant to 
to teach that his followers should have an exceeding great 
reward when He came in His glory. He went about doing 
good, not merely good in the abstract, not merely preach- 
ing good sermons, but practical, hedonistic good. He 
healed the sick, made the blind see; caused the lame to walk, 
cured insanity, raised the dead, and even gladdened the 
hearts of the wedding guests with excellent wine. All 
through his ministry, Jesus appealed to men's sentient na- 
ture. He reasoned with them; he pointed to their misery, 
discord and empty formalism, and urged them to turn to a 
reasonable course of life. And whether we accept his 
teaching as divine or merely human, we must admit that 
he points out the value of altruistic conduct for the indi- 
vidual as no one else has done before or since. I do not 
mean to say that there were no other important elements 
in the teaching of Jesus. That teaching was religious as 
well as ethical. We must also admit that an element of 
asceticism is to be found in the doctrines of Jesus as they 
come down to us. 

More tender than stoicism and more vigorous than 
epicureanism, the ethical doctrines of Jesus have done a 
great deal toward the spreading of Christianity through- 
out the world. 

The whole Jewish system of ethics is hedonistic. Even 
where its demands are given as the dictates of God, they are 
coupled more or less directly with the threats and prom- 



3T v. 33-44- 



A Plea for Hedonism. 35 

ises of Jahveh. It is true that the philosophic element was 
not prominent in the Jewish code. The rites and cere- 
monies are to be observed and performed because God has 
so commanded. The reward was to be directly bestowed 
by him, not as the natural consequence of obedience, but 
as a token of merit. But the formal code of conduct was 
too firmly instated by priest, levite and people to be 
shaken by the thundering arguments of Isaiah or the 
plaintive discourses of Jeremiah. But after all the Law of 
Moses was full of wise, hedonistic principles; with some ex- 
ceptions it was equitable, just and wise. The land-owner, 
the debtor, the widow, the orphan, the criminal, and even 
the stranger were wisely dealt with. The criminal law T was 
comparatively mild, the law of torts not too severe. The 
laws of marriage and divorce were among the best of 
ancient times and we know from history that Jewish 
family life was remarkably clean and high-toned. 

Confucius, too, adopted a hedonistic theory of ethics. 
His theory was more philosophical than that of the early 
Jews. He gave more reasons for the conduct which he 
prescribed; that is, he pointed out the value of the con- 
duct. Confucius, like Socrates, taught that morals and 
manners must begin with self knowledge. And while pre- 
scribing a minutely detailed code of action for the indi- 
vidual, which in the end became an incubus on Chinese 
civilization, yet his studies led him to see that altruism is 
only a wiser Hedonism; and while rejecting all religion he 
announced the same fundamental rule of conduct which 
Jesus prescribed, 500 years later, in the .Golden Rule. 
Had Confucius been succeeded by thinkers as broad as 
himself, who could have put life into his moral system, 
China might have made wonderful progress in civiliza- 
tion. Unfortunately, no ruler would accept his system of 
government; his disciples devoted themselves to the letter 
of the law, and China became ensnared in an impenetrable 
wilderness of formalism. 

Zarathustra, too, the moral and religious law-giver of 
the Persians, adopted hedonistic principles. Two great 
beings, the one li^ht or good, and the other darkness, or 
evil, have been engaged in a struggle for supremacy from 



86 A Tha, tor Hedonism. 

all eternity. But the good being is on the side of the 
welfare, or good of the individual; the evil or dark being 
is constantly endeavoring to injure mankind. In the end 
the good will triumph and those who are on his side will 
receive their reward. Zoroastrianism has many wise 
hedonistic maxims and principles, tending to promote the 
welfare of the individual and society. 

Buddha, likewise, was a moral reformer. And like 
most moral reformers, he was stirred to thought and 
activity by the misery and wretchedness which he saw 
around him. After devoting many years to the study of 
the problem of evil, he reached the conclusion that happi- 
ness consists in Nirvana, or perfect peace. But the peace 
of Buddhism, while it frees one from suffering and is thus 
hedonistic, is almost the peace of non-existence. Never- 
theless, all the doctrines of Buddha are based on the 
fundamental idea of escaping from sentient evil. The 
prescibed course of conduct is directed entirely toward the 
attainment of Nirvana, or escape from suffering. The 
fact that Buddha and Confucius were unable to point to a 
larger hope in the life beyond, as did Socrates and Jesus, 
does not militate against our argument. Their doctrine 
was negatively hedonistic, while the doctrines of Jesus and 
Socrates are both positively and negatively hedonistic. 

Buddha, like Confucius and Zarathustra, studied the 
consequences of actions and with an endless prolixity of 
formal details, he mingles wise, hedonistic principles of 
conduct, based on the observation of human society, 
human greed and human frailty. Overburdened with the 
sense of the wretchedness which all the watchfulness ©f his 
guardians could not conceal from him, he left his princely 
home to study in peace and quiet the problem of evil. 
Like Moses and Confucius, he returned, fertile in plans for 
improving the welfare of his fellowmen. His theory of life 
was more spiritual than that of Confucius, but the prob- 
lem which he was trying to solve was precisely the same: 
to wit, the problem of human misery and human happi- 
ness. 

I spoke above of popular wisdpm. This wisdom is set 
forth among every people in the form of proverbs and 



A Plea for Hedonism. 87 

fatto. These proverbs and fables embody the condensed 
and pithily expressed experience of the race. Prof. Legge 
says that for centuries * the Chinaman has been largely 
guided in the conduct of his life by the excellent maxims 
of Confucius. Jewish literature, too, is rich in proverbs. 
The same is true of the Arabic, a near relative of the 
Hebrew. Among savage tribes the philosophy of life is 
usually embodied in familiar proverbs, which are passed 
from mouth to mouth and from father to son. Originat- 
ing as they do and passing from country to country, 
these s-ayings are often couched in the most 
contradictory terms, and embody the most conflicting 
theories of life. But a careful study of them will show 
that they are drawn from a more or less rich experience, 
and that they are all based on hedonistic principles. 
Frequently they prescribe rules of conduct for the indi- 
vidual which are apparently injurious to him, and yet 
they are accepted as a part of the prudential philosophy 
of the tribe. For example, ' 'Honesty is the best policy," 
announces the result of a large experience in dishonesty by 
the whole race. Its truth is often hard to realize, yet 
many a man has been governed by this simple maxim 
when conscience, the sense of duty, and the fear of Grod 
were unable to control his actions. Men who were unable 
to comprehend the reasonings of Isaiah and Socrates 
could lay up in memory the maxims of Solomon and the 
fables of iEsop. And there is reason to believe that the 
modern Englishman, German, or American is more influ- 
enced by the proverbs in which our languages are so rich, 
than he is by the subtle, metaphysical doctrines of Kant 
and Martineau, Luther and Edwards. 

But all proverbial philosophy is professedly a pruden- 
tial philosophy. It tells the individual what his prede- 
cessors have found most profitable in life. It gives him 
the benefit of their experiences; condenses into a line for 
him the biography of a race. Proverbial philosophy is 
often trustworthy, too. It comes with no ax to grind, 
no system to maintain, no party to support. Like the 
pebble on the river beach, it comes from no man knows 
where; and, like the pebble, it has been tossed and tried 



38 A Plea for Hedonism. 

until it is worn smooth and perfect. Hence the proverb- 
ial philosophy of any people is well worthy of study. 
These gems of thought, these heirlooms of experience 
which have survived the mutations of kingdoms and 
peoples are more priceless than the treasures of princes. 
And what is the burden of their tale? Is not their united 
voice to the effect that, "Experience is the best teacher;" 
that "your sin will find jou out;" that "The thief will 
be caught in his own trap;" that "One lie makes two 
more necessary;" that "If you cast your bread upon the 
waters it will return to you after many days;" that "He 
who sows the wind, will reap the whirlwind"? Chastity, 
honesty, veracity, mercy, bravery, modesty, industry, 
patience, friendliness, shu, or reciprocity, (the golden 
word of Confucius), are all based on sound prudential 
reason. The experience of the race has demonstrated and 
in these proverbs embodied the fact that these virtues are 
not empty forms, not incomprehensible principles, not the 
dictates of a whimsical deity, not the froth of an evanes- 
cent sentiment, but that they are the rational maxims of 
a happy life, the fundamental principles of a moral sciene 
base on human nature and solicitous for human welfare. 

But not only have the professedly ethical theories 
which have had the most widespread influence among 
mankind drawn their main strength from their hedonistic 
principles, teachings, threats and promises; not only have 
the popular principles of conduct and theories of the 
destiny of man, as embodied in proverbs, maxims and 
omens, accepted Hedonism as the ultimate desffrry of the 
race, but the great religious systems of the race, which 
have been already more or less closely associated with their 
ethical principles and moralmaxims, have likewise rested 
on a similar basis. Fear and hope are the sentiments to 
which religion has always appealed, fear of present or 
future evil or suffering, hope of future peace or bliss. 
Sometimes the evil to be escaped and the reward to be 
obtained was expected in the present life, sometimes in 
a more or less definite life in another world, sometimes, as 
among the Buddhists, the Egyptians and some of the 
Greeks, in a future earthly life (Karma transmigration); 



A Plea wr Hedomism. 89 

and sometimes, as among the ancient Jews, in th§ lives of 
one's descendants. 

Ancestor worship certainly sprang from hedonistic 
motives. A man believed in a more or less vague way 
that the spirits of the departed still retained power for 
good and evil. It was important, therefore, to keep in 
their good graces by offerings, sacrifices and ceremonial 
attentions. Where ancestor worship prevails, a man's 
good fortune and evil fortune, his health and his sickness, 
his rich harvests and his famines, his good luck and his 
accidents are attributed to the good or ill will of these 
ancestors. Hence ancestor worship, especially among 
people who show no great love for their kindred while 
they are on earth, is purely a prudential affair, almost a 
matter of business. 

And among the idol worshipers it is very common to 
reproach the god for not performing his part of the 
contract. Sometimes he is even beaten, or mistreated in 
other ways to awaken him to the fact that where he has 
received the stipulated offerings and sacrifices, he should 
send the needed blessings, rain, health, good crops, game, 
or whatever it may be. 

Even among the most highly civilized Christians this 
feeling still lingers. The man who goes to church 
regularly, is kind to his family, gives to the poor, treats 
his neighbor squarely, is apt to think that the Lord 
should prosper him and to feel abused if his crops are 
bad, his children are sick, or especially if a .serious acci- 
dent or misfortune befall him. 

Hero worship is even more clearly hedonistic than 
ancestor worship. For the affection which might lead 
one to perform certain rites in memory of a beloved 
parent does not exist toward a departed king or ruler. 
One may be devoted to a good ruler, but it is because 
that ruler has proven serviceable, has lightened the bur- 
den of taxes, driven off the public enemy, punished inter- 
nal disorder, enforced law and equity among his subjects, 
and broadened the opportunities of the individual to lead 
a happy and undisturbed life. It is the belief that the 
wise ruler can still do something for his subjects that 



40 A Plea for Hedonism. 

leads them to curry favor with Ms departed spirit. It is 
fear of the despotic ruler that leads to the effort to 
appease the wrath of his departed spirit. 

I have already spoken of Confucianism, the ethical 
religion of the Chinese, of Buddhism, the religion accepted 
by so many millions in India and China, and of the 
system of Zoroastrianism, the religion of Persia. All of 
these were seen to rest on hedoDistic doctrines and prin- 
ciples. Judaism, too, v. as a hedonistic religion. The Old 
Testament is full of threats and promises. Ajid the most 
frequent argument of the religious leaders was to point 
to the hedonistic results of obedience and disobedience. 
The Jew firmly believed that the conquests and other 
national disasters were the direct result of unfaithfulness 
to the Mosaic law, and that the restoration and preserva- 
tion of the remnant was due to their repentance and 
reformation. Although they believed themselves to be 
God's favorite and peculiar people, they did not expect 
him to favor them unless they faithfully obeyed his com- 
mands; and conversely, if they were obedient, they 
expected the favor of heaven. 

The Mohammedans are, if possible, even more hedon- 
istic and practical in their religious beliefs and observances 
than the ancient Jews. Their Gfod is a just Grod; and by 
a just God, they mean a Grod who stands strictly by his 
contract^ Worship him according to his commands and 
he will bless you in this world and the next. Disobey him 
and he will punish you in this life and damn you eternally 
in the next. Grod has revealed his will, his promises and 
his punishments in the Koran. Follow the Koran, and 
your welfare for time and eternity is assured. 

I have already spoken of the ethical system of Jesus. 
Christianity, which sprang from his teachings is com- 
monly supposed to be opposed to all hedonistic systems. 
It is supposed to be a religion of self-denial, of unselfish- 
ness, of altruistic conduct. But Christianity is the child 
of Judaism, and, as I showed above, Jesus based all 
his arguments on hedonistic principles. The selfishness 
which Jesus and his followers condemn is the narrow 
selfishness which in the end is net truly self-beneficial. 



A Plea for Hedonism. 41 

Christianity claims to save men not only from the eternal 
penalties of their sins, but it as distinctly offers eternal 
happiness to those who accept the simple plan of salva- 
tion, and peace that passeth understanding throughout 
the earthly life. The self-denial which the Christian advo- 
cates can be accepted by the consistent hedonist, — at any 
rate when coupled with the blessings held out by Chris- 
tianity. If those blessings are guaranteed, the most 
ardent hedonist will admit that the self-denial is worth 
while. It is true that the more spiritual Christians profess 
to base their doctrines on love and not on the hope of 
reward. But if heaven and hell were cancelled from the 
doctrines of Christianity, there is reason to fear that 
there would be a great falling off in the number of Chris- 
tians. A few high spirits may find Kant's doctrine of 
duty and the doctrine of love sufficient sanctions of con- 
duct. But for the great majority of mankind duty in the 
abstract and love in the abstract would prove almost 
totally worthless as sanctions of conduct. Common men 
must have a sanction of a more practical kind. The con- 
sequences of conduct must be kept before their eyes. 

Even the force of habit, even the strongest religious 
beliefs, will not hold men to conduct which they plainly 
see it is to their interest to avoid. And if the promise of 
inconceivably rich rewards and the threats of inconceiv- 
ably awful punishments have not been able to constrain 
men to obey the rules of Christianity with even plausible 
strictness, how much more would these rules be neglected 
if these terrible sanctions were abolished? 

One feels safe in saying that even if the negative 
sanctions, the punishments, were abolished, the neglect of 
Christianity would increase in a marked degree. This, too, 
not only in spite of a future reward but in the face of the 
fact that Christianity is largely based on philosophical 
hedonistic principles. The reaction would be due to the 
fact that too many people accept Christianity through 
fear. They are afraid to disobey. They have not grasped 
the philosophy of conduct. They do not perceive that 
Christianity is pointing out the line of conduct which is 
best for the individual. They feel that they must be 



42 A Plea tor Hedonism. 

"good" in order to escape bell and consequently "good- 
ness" is always a burden to them. Because it Is forced on 
them they dislike it, just as a school boy dislikes his 
studies. The same state of facts doubtless exists among 
the followers of all religions. Fear and not reason holds 
them to the mark. Here and there a thoughtful individ- 
ual catches a glimpse of the beauty of holiness, of the 
reasonableness of the philosophy of the prescribed con- 
duct, (if it happens to be reasonable or philosophical, 
which too often is not the .case.) But the masses obey 
blindly and doggedly, because they think they must. 

But if the ethical and religious thinkers who have had 
the greatest influence on the lives and conduct of their 
fellowmen have attained this result by an appeal to the 
sentience of their hearers, and by a demonstration of the 
personal advantage of accepting their doctrines, the 
political and economic thinkers have still more plainly 
and emphatically appealed to prudential reasons. 
Even those statesmen who have insisted most strongly on 
the divine origin of kings and other institutions, have 
felt compelled to bolster up their claims by sanctions of 
a sentient nature, that is, by a system of rewards and 
punishments. But the true statesman, the wise ruler, in 
all ages and nations has had the welfare of the people at 
heart and has sought to provide the political and eco- 
nomic institutions which would best promote the general 
welfare. Whatever additional prerogatives have been 
claimed for the state, the protection of the citizen from 
external enemies, the suppression of crime, the mainten- 
ance of good order and justice have always been recog- 
nized as falling within the sphere of duties or rights of the 
ruler. Moses and Manu, Solon and Lycurgus, Murna and 
Justinian, Washington and Gladstone all had the welfare 
of the people at heart. It is true that the glory of the 
state has sometimes blinded men's eyes to the needs of 
the people. But however this may have been, it is now 
universally admitted that the ruler should constantly 
have in mind the welfare of the people. 

Utility, not consistency with any abstract theory, is 
the modern test of political and economic science. And 



A Plea lor Hedonism. 43 

in the political systems of the past, it was the useful 
institutions which preserved the systems and made them 
acceptable. Take the Common and Statue Law of 
England. It was not its theory of the divine rights of 
kings, its subjection of women, its descent by primogeni- 
ture, its aristocratic electoral system, or its state- 
supported church which made it so strong and so 
valuable. Its admirable system of justice, its Magna 
Charta and Habeas Corpus, its Court of Equity and House 
of Commons, and above all its constant appeal to 
sentient facts and common sense were its real strength 
and grandeur. 

The same is true of the Roman law, from which 
English law drew far more than its admirers like to 
admit. The exceeding flexibility of both these systems, 
where flexibility permitted improvement in the interests 
of the general welfare, and their stern inflexibility where 
there would have been danger to the public or the 
individual good, is the secret of their inestimable value. 
Unconsciously resting on the sound good sense of practi- 
cal men, Roman and English law are living monuments of 
the value of hedonism . 

But the case for Hedonism grows clearer and stronger 
as we proceed. If the political and economic systems of 
the world which have proved the most durable and excel- 
lent are more obviously hedonistic than the religious and 
ethical systems, the social systems of the progressive 
nations show still more clearly the marks of hedonism. 
This subject is so vast that one can do little more than 
call attention to its more salient features. 

Questions of family life, of education, of pauperism, of 
the helpless and disabled, of marriage and divorce, of the 
prevention and suppression of vice, of amusements, of 
health and disease, trade, commerce and science, must be 
determined by hedonistic rules. 

The first requisite of the continued existence of the 
individual and of the race is the observance of the rules of 
health. No one will claim that these rules can be deter- 
mined otherwise than by experience, that is, by the canon 
of consequences. The final purpose of man's earthly 



44 A Plea tor Hedonism . 

sojourn is not yet positively known, unless we accept the 
evidence of- revealed religkm. Unless, therefore, conduct 
which conduces to the* pleasan test possible life is clearly 
forbidden by an authoritative revelation, the hedonist 
insists that that conduct is legitimate. More than this, 
a revelation which ran counter to the laws of health would 
have to be very clear and positive or intelligent men would 
refuse to accept it. Such practices as self mutilation, 
self torture, excessive fasting, celibacy, asceticism, and 
deliberate poverty have gradually become discounte- 
nanced by intelligent man. They belong to a philosophy 
of pain, which, however strong a hold it may once have 
held on the religious consciousness of mankind, has grad- 
ually fallen into disfavor. The number of men who 
believe that Grod takes delight in the sufferings of any of 
his creatures is rapidly decreasing and the sooner they 
have all disappeared the better it will be for the race. 
The religion which attempts to retard the wheels of 
progress will certainly and deservedly be crushed in the 
attempt. But progress means increase in intelligence, 
strength, health, skill and happiness; increase in the 
knowledge of the laws of nature and of the human con- 
stitution; and increase in skill in the application of the 
knowledge for the benefit of humanity. Progress means 
an elevation of the ideal of human destiny and an increase 
in the effort to attain that ideal. Progress means the 
discovery of the causes of human misery and wretched- 
ness, and the removal of those evils, in so far as it lies 
within human power to remove them. Progress means 
faithfulness to truth and honesty about facts, though all 
our preconceived notions and theories must be sacrificed. 

IV. THE DIFFICULTIES OF HEDONISM. 

A Plea for Hedonism which should neglect to examine 
the many objections which have been made t© the doctrine 
would be a very one sided argument. The attempt to 
answer all the objections which have been put forward in 
opposition to our theory would be to write a book as 
large as those of Thomas Aquinas and Kichard Cumber- 
land. But a glance at some of the chief objections will 



A Plea for Hedonism. * 45 

serye to strengthen the position of Hedonism as the real 
guide to conduct. 

1. The "Sum of Pleasures." 

Among the objections most frequently advanced 
against our theory is that which the late Professor T. H. 
Green dwelt most upon, to wit: that there can be no "sum 
of pleasures" and that therefore it is not possible to 
strive for "the greatest possible sum of pleasures". 

That pleasure cannot be gathered like black-berries 
and heaped up in baskets, everyone will admit. But that 
one may enjoy a greater amount of pleasure or happiness 
than another, everyone knows to be the case. In matters 
of food, two loaves are better than one; in matters of 
clothing, two blankets are better than one; in matters of 
senses, two eyes are better than one; two ears better than 
one; in matters of activity, two hands and two feet are 
better than one hand and one foot. In matters of 
education, two years of schooling are better than one, 
two hundred volumes more serviceable than one hundred; 
in matters of agriculture, two horses are better than one, 
two cows better than one, a two story house better than 
a one story house. So in matters of pure enjoyment, a 
two days vacation is preferable to one day, two chickens 
go farther at a picnic than one, two pounds of candy than 
one, two bottles of wine than one. If those who argue 
that there can be no summation of pleasures mean to say 
that there is no such thing as varying the. amount of 
one's pleasures, they are talking against facts. If they 
mean anything else they do not interest either;,the Hedon- 
ist or the practical man. 35 

2. The Problem of Responsibility. 

It is sometimes objected to the doctrine of Hedonism 
that it destroys human responsibility. For if each indi- 
vidual is his own judge as to what will promote his great- 
est happiness, other men have no ground for interference, 
even if he is mistaken. The contented swine knows his 
own mind better than any one else can know it, and if 

35 See Taylor, Prob of Conduct, p, 530, 



46 A Plea for Hedonism. 

the wallow furnishes him the means of the purest enjoy- 
ment, creatures who do not care for the mire should not 
interfere. 

There is an element of truth in this contention. We 
must not try to force upon a nature interests which are 
wholly alien to it. By no possible contrivance can the 
pig be made to enjoy the parlor as much as he enjoys his 
wallow. And if it were necessary to take pig natures into 
account in the state and in society, it would be necessary 
to make allowance for this fact. 36 But while human tem- 
peraments vary greatly, they do not vary so greatly as 
do the temperament of a man and a pig. There are cer- 
tain general traits which are found in all men's natures, 
certain likes and dislikes, certain sympathies and antip- 
athies. It is on the basis of these traits that society and 
the state are constructed. 37 Within certain limits we 
encourage individuality, but certain bounds must not be 
passed by the individual. He must not commit murder, 
arson, theft, slander, assault and battery, adultery or 
nuisance. Every intelligent man is presumed to know 
the evil consequences of such acts, in terms of welfare 
(pleasure and pain), upon his neighbors. Their effects are 
so uniformly evil that the state itself attends to their 
punishment. There is an implied agreement among all 
moral citizens not to commit such deeds. Other acts, 
such as drunkenness, lying and rudeness the state does 
not attempt to punish unless accompanied by acts of 
interference with the rights of others. The child and the 
lunatic are 'excused from responsibility for the same 
reason that the dumb beast is excused. They lack the 
intelligence necessary to link cause and effect. The prob- 
lem at which criminologists are now working is whether 
the criminal has that degree of intelligence which should 
enable him to see the results of his act as they are seen by 
the normal man. 88 But even if a man is lacking in intelli- 



^Hoffding, Ethik., p. 109. 

37 See W. Wallace, lectures and Essays, pp. 250 and 261 et seq. 
38 Whar4:on, Crim. Law, I. ch. 2; WbVs Pollock on the Iyaw of 
Torts, ch. 2,- p. 23. See WV Wallace, op„ cit f 310, 



A Plea for Hedonism. 47 

gence, the sanctions of law and morals are sometimes 
binding upon him. If he knows that an act is forbidden 
under a given penalty, he should be punished, even if he 
is not able to reason out the full consequence of his act. 39 
For only thus can society maintain its existence. Luna- 
tics and small children are greatly restrained by the 
certainty of punishment, although they are unable to 
appreciate the reason for the establishment of punish- 
ment. In fact, the philosophers themselves have not yet 
come to an agreement as to the basis and grounds of 
punishment. 

The limits, also, within which society shall restrain 
the actions of the individual are still a matter of dispute. 
The Socialist would have the state take charge of almost 
the whole human life, while the individualist would limit 
state control to the enforcement of the criminal law. 
This is not the place to follow up the discussion; suffice it 
to say that in our opinion the question is purely one of 
utility. If the majority of the citizens within a given area 
prefer socialism, it seems to me that they are justified in 
adopting such a mode of government. The individual 
who dislikes such a course can move away or exert his 
influence to reform the law. What I have said above does 
not amount to saying that might makes right. At least, 
if by right is meant the greatest welfare of the individuals 
of the society. For the action of the majority may really 
prove injurious or even destructive to the society. Such 
a course makes only a relative right or political right. 40 
Conformity to the social law, whatever it may be, entitles 
one to the social approval and the escape from the sanc- 
tions of the social law. Rut such conformity does not 
ensure the actor his greatest happiness or welfare. Nor 
has any society more than a relative justification in 
adopting a law which is not for the welfare of the society. 
An independent people is responsible to.no other earthly 



39 Sidgwick, Meth. of Eth., Bk. I, ch. 5; Maudsley, Responsibility in 
Xvlental Disease. 

4<> Herein ljes the fallacy of F|obbes v who made the political sanction 
to conduct absolute. Leviathan, ch. 26, 



48 A Plea for Hedonism. 

power for its acts, but that does not make its acts abso- 
lutely right. Only correspondence with the greatest wel- 
fare of the society can make a law absolutely right. 41 As 
A. E. Taylor says, "When the evolution of ethical senti- 
ment is complete, I am responsible to myself for obedience 
to a law which I impose on myself, for the discharge of 
duties which I expect of myself, and should continue to 
expect, though God and man were to agree to connive at 
my disregard of them 48 . In other words, when I have 
adopted my ethical ideal, no matter what it may be, I 
have become a law unto myself, the judge of my own 
action." 4 * 

3. The Variability of Human Nature. 

Another objection which has been often urged against 
Hedonism is that human nature is so variable as to make 
any standard of action based thereon of little if any value. 
This objection is not substantially different from the last 
preceding. What pleases my taste may be disgusting to 
my neighbor. What he likes may be repulsive to me. 
The tastes of youth vary from the taste of old age. The 
young love activity, noise, strife, opposition. The old 
love quiet, peace, unanimity, concordance. One man 
loves self-assertion, boldness, courage, coolness, nerve 
and skill. Another prefers humility, meekness, kindness, 
affection and grace. One man prefers wealth and pomp, 
praise and prominence. Another prefers a quiet nook 
with his pipe and his book, or independence and rags like 
Huckleberry Finn. One man is self-contained and prefers 
his own company to that of any one else. Another lives 
in the conversation and opinions of other men. One man 
never loses sight of his own interests; his every act is a 
move to promote his own welfare. Another is naturally 
sympathetic. He seldom thinks of his own welfare, but is 

"Since the above was written I find that Prof. William Wallace 
has already expressed the same idea in much better terms. See Essays 
and Lectures, pp. 253-4. 

42 A. B. Taylor, The Problem of Conduct, p. 153. 

* 3 Kant no doubt had this evolutionary product in mind when he 
declared for the famous "categorical imperative." 



A Plea tor Hedonism. 49 

always studying how he can do more to make his fellow- 
men happier. One man spends all his substance for the 
good of others. Another wears himself out devising 
methods for getting possession of the goods of others. 
Differences of temperament are familiar to us all. 44 How 
will the hedonist reconcile all this variability? 

The hedonist will not reconcile it at all. He takes 
men as they are. When he finds that the benevolent dis- 
position is for the social good, he will join with nature in 
encouraging such men. But the greater part of the 
problem nature must solve. She has probably found use 
for courage, anger, covetousness, and pugnacity in the 
past, or she would have rooted them out of human 
nature before this. 45 "This variability of sentiment is but 
the concomitant of the transition from the aboriginal 
type of society fitted for destructive activities, to the civi- 
lized type fitted for peaceful activities." But so long as 
this variability exists, of course the line of conduct of 
differently constituted individuals could not be expected 
agree in all respects. 

The hedonist is not bound to lay down any hard and 
fast rules of conduct. He insists, on the contrary, on the 
greatest freedom for all in the formation and pursuit of 
these ideals. Certain general rules all must observe; but 
beyond these, there is a wide field left open for the individ- 
ual choice and preference. 

4. The Paradox of Hedonism. 

One of the most frequently mentioned objections to 
Hedonism is the so-called "Paradox of Hedonism". In 
the briefly worded phrase of Prof. Sidgwick, "To get 
pleasure, one must forget it." Sidgwick and others urge 
that pleasure cannot be the end or aim of conduct from 
the fact that when we fix our thoughts too closely on 
the pleasure which our activities are to bring us, the 
result is generally disappointing. The pleasure seeker is 
by no means the happiest of mortals. Men who fix their 



^ee Lotze, Micrososmus, Bk. VI., ch. 2. 

4 ^See Spender, Prin. Peyc.,,11, §524. 



50 A Plea for Hedonism. 

minds on the attainment of other objects than their own 
pleasures are usually the most contented and happy. 

Those who raise this objection neglect, it seems to me, 
several important psychological phenomena. The first 
of these is the law of attention. The human mind is so 
constituted that the field of clear consciousness is always 
narrow. And owing to the fact that human ideals must 
be attained by more or less elaborate means or processes, 
it is generally necessary to concentrate tke attention so 
closely on the means and details, that the ideal or ulti- 
mate purpose of the conduct is for the time shut out from 
the field of consciousness; just as the top of the hill is 
shut off by the windings of the road. These facts are so 
familiar that it appears stranger that a psychologist 
with the penetration which Sidgwick possessed should 
overlook them. But while our ideal may be forgotten 
while we are devoting attention to the means, it has not 
really passed into oblivion. Jacob, for instance, during 
the seven years of his service for the hand of Rachel must 
have found it constantly necessary to devote his whole 
attention to his work. But the ultimate reward was 
before him all the time. Had Rachel died, his course of 
life would have been instantly changed. Young Hanni- 
bal, too, as he underwent the weary exercises necessary 
to train him for the hardy life of a soldier, must have 
frequently forgot his oath to destroy Rome, yet that 
oath spurred him on through all trials and hardships. So 
the man who devotes his life to art, science or literature 
must frequently lose himself in the drudgery of essential 
preparation and discipline, yet he expects the attainment 
of his ideal to bring a great satisfaction and pleasure. 

Once more, those who insist upon the paradox of 
Hedonism, as well as those who hold that pleasure is not 
the only object of desire 46 forget the sources and nature of 
pleasure. For our present purposes, it is only necessary 
to point out that activity as such is usually agreeable. 
Compulsory inactivity is the severest punishment to most 
men. For this reason the pursuit of aa iieal is often as 

^Especially Green, Prolog, to Ethics, p. 186 et seq. 



A Plea lor Hedonism. 51 

pleasant or even pleasanter than the attainment thereof. 
Thus all kinds of games afford amusement, the end to be 
accomplished being quite subordinate. Once more, the 
mere contemplation or the accomplishment of success is 
often a sufficient motive to justify much toil and trouble, 
regardless of the importance of the success itself. 

Some men are willing to devote a lifetime of drudgery 
to accomplish an ideal, which other men would regard as 
trivial. Others again derive their enjoyment from the 
struggle in which they engage, from the victories and 
triumphs which they secure, regardless of the actual ulti- 
mate value to themselves or others of these achievements. 
Again, some men prefer the enjoyment of as much inactiv- 
ity as possible. Such natures would prefer an eternity of 
Nirvana to one of "playing on a golden harp" or other 
activity. 

Lastly, the pleasures of some men are intellectual, 
those of others, emotional, and those of others, sensual. 
The intellectual and sensual pleasures relate more closely 
to the self than do the emotional. MaDy of the emotional 
pleasures arise from altruistic activities. Some men are 
so constituted that activity for the benefit of others is 
always more enjoyable to them than self-beneficial activi- 
ties. For a mind so constituted, no doubt it is true that 
the best way to get a pleasure is to forget it. And in all 
the cases above mentioned, it is evident that the ideal is 
either a purely pleasant or agreeable one or else involves 
sufficient pleasure or satisfaction in its attainment to 
make it come under the category of Hedonism. The 
course of life which one prefers to follow and would 
willingly pursue a second time is hedonistic, whether the 
goal of that life or only the struggle toward that goal is 
the ground of that satisfaction and desirability. Un- 
trammeled preferability is the real hedonistic test. Hence 
those, such as Green, 47 who attempt to distinguish 
between "pleasure' ' and "self-satisfaction" are making a 
limitation which Hedonism refuses to recognize. Men's 
prefeianees lie at the base of their activities. Hedonism 

* 7 op. cit. p. 187, 



52 A Plea for Hedonism. 

seeks to reach and guide through these preferences. In 
some cases the preferences themselves need enlightenment. 
That is the business of the scienes. In other cases new 
preferences are needed. This is never strictly the business 
of ethics— assisting nature. 

V. THE PROBLEM OF ALTRUISM. 

1. Pseudo Altruism. 

Our purpose, then, is to outline, if possible, a philos- 
ophy of conduct; that is, to show what line of conduct is 
most desirable or preferable, under the circumstancs of a 
particular environment. So much of conduct, therefore, 
as can be shown to be desirable to the individual as an 
individual, whether it is also conducive to social welfare 
or not, that is, whether it is socially desirable or not, need 
not concern us in the present section. (Kant ruled self- 
benefitting acts out of the province of ethics. ) For, if 
under every possible view of the environment, present and 
future, the proposed line of conduct is desirable or prefer- 
able for the individual, we must assume that the individ- 
ual will follow that line of conduct if possible, as soon as 
he becomes aware of this fact. The trouble in the past 
has been that the individual took too narrow a* view of 
the environment and was unable to see that conduct 
which was socially desirable was also individually desir- 
able. Thus the advantage of association in the largest 
possible groups under similar laws did not become 
apparent to men for thousands of years. But the destruc- 
tion of tribes who failed to see the advantage of larger 
unions, and the gradual development of the more fortu- 
nate tribes and nations which combined their strength 
has at last developed the idea of world empires. The 
advantages of universal education, of faithful fulfillment 
of contracts, of veracity and honesty, of chastity and 
sobriety, of politeness, neighborliness, considerateness 
and respectfulness have only gradually dawned on the 
human mind. That a perfectly selfish and unsympa- 
thetic man may contribute largely to the social welfare in 
all these and many other ways is apparent. T^hus a wise 
man might so act among a savage tribe as to gain the 



A Plea for Hedonism. 58 

credit of \ being exceedingly altruistic, and yet be act- 
ing all the time in his own interest. This policy is now 
very commonly pursued among enterprising merchants 
and traders, not only among savages, but in the midst of 
the highest .civilization. From what we have, 
sad, it is apparent that a vast amount of con- 
duct is credited as altruistic or disinterested which 
is not so in reality. It is further apparent that much 
activity is called disinterested which would not be so called 
if we were well enough informed to see that the actor is 
really working for his own benefit, that is, that in addi- 
tion to the altruistic results of his actions they have also 
self-beneficial results which amply justify them. In many 
eases, too, the actor looks on these self-beneficial results 
as a sort of reward for the altruistic consequences of his 
acts, and is thus further supported in his action by the 
consciousness of a supposed merit, a merit which would 
disappear could all men clearly perceive the self-beneficial 
consequences of the acts. For we do not ascribe merit to 
acts whose beneficial consequences to the actor are clearly 
and certainly foreseen. But these concepts of equity and 
justice, which lead us daily to a thousand acts without a 
thought o ftheir having any moral quality whatsoever are 
the product of age— any training of the race in social 
experiences. By means of the canon of consequences, we 
have become so thoroughly drilled in the more common 
matters of social intercourse, that it is only with an 
effort that we can perceive their moral quality. Hence 
the line between pseudo-altruism and prudence is gradually 
being pushed back, as men perceive the prudential advan- 
tage of a given course of action— that it is clearly to the 
advantage of the actor to follow it, one ceases to attrib- 
ute merit to the act. As we show in the next section, 
there is reason to believe, and it is the object of Hedonism 
to point out to all men, that the field of prudence will in 
time cover the entire field of human voluntary activities. 

2. Eational Altruism. 

There is another important group of activities which 
are commonly classed as disinterested, which on closer 



54 A Plea lor Hedonism. 

examination turn out to be only a sUlbffci&r l&em of 
interested activities. Take the familiar tfase of a tfaan 
who enters an arm y. If uninstructed, the n&tupal impulse 
would be to run when danger appears. But the wise 
general will explain to his soldiers that a bold front often 
frightens the enemy away, that even where this does not 
happen, that by standing firmly together each individual 
is really much safer than if he attempts to retreat. 
Following such instruction the soldier learns to face the 
danger and stand by his comrades when they are in 
danger. The importance of keeping watch is appreciated 
by all, and therefore when the turn of any individual 
comes to stand sentinel, he takes the chances of being shot 
for the sake of preserving himself and others, and also for 
the sake of having others stand sentinel when their turn 
comes. 

Take now a more intricate case. We Mave Indicated 
above that the wise man learns the value in the long run 
of veracity, honesty, chastity, kindness, politeness and 
the many other social virtues. But he also finds that 
these virtues can only be acquired by eonstant exercise. 
This constant exercise forms a habit. Now, when a case 
comes where a lie would possibly be advantageous, the 
habit of veracity has become so strong that the truth 
comes out, even while the speaker realizes that it may 
cost his fortune or his life. A thoughtful man may have 
reflected on the possibility of such an occurrence early in 
life. But it was only a possibility and the chances in 
favor of its not occurring, or the net gain of truth telling 
may have been such as to lead him consciously to take 
the chances, or to take the smaller evil with the greater 
good. Where the whole course of conduct is profitable, 
then the particular instance where the course proves dis- 
advantageous should not be classed as disinterested, 
especially where it was necessary to form a habit of acting 
in the given way in order to attain the best results. But 
experience teaches that all the common virtues, which on 
the whole are recognized by intelligent people as profit- 
able to the actor, but which in particular instances could 
be departed from with advantage by the ack>r, can attain 



A Plea for Hedonism. 66 

their fullest usefeikkeas only by constant and unremitted 
practice all through life, thereby making them ataost 
mechanical by habitual practice. Thus the habit? of 
veracity may become so fixed as to make death easier 
than falsehood. While frequent departure from the truth 
makes lying so easy as to give no sting of conscience 
whatever. The same is true as to faithfulness to promises. 
To a man like Regulus, death by torment is preferable to 
breach of promise. A man who has not trained himself 
to this habitual fidelity to promises would feel amply 
justified in breaking a promise extorted as was the 
promise of Regulus. The same rule holds good as to pro- 
fanity, to abstinence from intoxicants and sexual indul- 
gence, and to honesty. 48 Self-culture, which is the aim of 
self- discipline, is the contradictory of social justice, which 
is the aim of true altruism. This self-cultivating activity 
I have called rational altruism. When two habitual 
virtues come into conflict, we have a curious altruistic 
puzzle, such as the problem of veracity when in conflict 
with the habit or impulse of kindness. Shall I lie to 
prevent the wrongful death or injury of a friend? This 
question has puzzled philosophers from the days of Aris- 
totle, to those of James Martineau. Rational altruism 
would apparently solve the problem in favor of veracity; 
but pure altruism, submitting to the power of the altru- 
istic sentiment, will probably always solve it in favor of 
kindness. 

The foregoing remarks are intended to show the 
reader how narrow the margin of conflict is between 
activity which is socially beneficial and that 
which is beneficial for the individual but injurious 
to society. The narrower this margin can be made to 
appear, the easier it will be to persuade men to live 
morally. For so long as you can point out to a man 
that the line of conduct which you suggest is really prefer- 
able for him, is in fact that which he would follow if he 
knew his own interest, you may expect that he will listen 

48 Taylor brings the above distinction out very clearly in Chap. V. of 
his Problem of Ethics. 



56 A Plea tor Hedonism. 

to you. But if you appeal to a man's conscience, to his 
sense of duty, to the social welfare, or the happiness of 
posterity, you may' feel sure that he will listen to you 
unwillingly. No one can calculate the amount of misery 
which exists because men are either following unwillingly 
a course of action which they feel in duty bound to 
follow, but would prefer not to follow, or are living for self, 
while feeling that t hey ought to be doing something else. 
An ethical theory, therefore, which can convince men, even 
in a small degree 1 hat what they think duty is really self- 
interest, and what they think self-interest is really often 
injurious will conf * r a great boon on mankind. There is 
misery and wretchedness in life at best, without any mpre 
of it based on unnecessary grounds. 

3. Pure Altru ism. 

But after all has been said that it is possible to say in 
the way of narrow ing the margin of conflict between self- 
interest and altruism, we must acknowledge that there is 
still a margin left. The welfare of the individual, at the 
present day, does not quite correspond, so far as we can 
see, with the welfare of humanity. More than this, 
individuals are found who are consciously acting in ehe 
interest of society to the detriment of their own interests. 
Real self-sacrifice is a fact so familiar that we cannot 
shut our eyes to it. Heroism is a word to be found in 
most languages, and heroes are to found in all ages and 
among all peoples. Maternal love, social sympathy and 
pity are too well known to be denied. Moreover, the 
efforts of Bentham, James Mill and others to reduce 
altruism to terms of self-interest were not successful. 49 
No doubt they had in mind the instances we have given 
above of pseudo-altruism and rational altruism. But we 
must admit many cases of true self-sacrifice, conscious, 
deliberate self-sacrifice. How shall we account for these 
cases? That self-sacrifice is not logically justifiable on 
hedonistic principles we must continue to assert. But if 
it is not logically justifiable, how can it be accounted for? 

* 9 Stephen, the Eng. Util., I. p. 313 et seq; II. 321. 



A Plea for Hedonism. 57 

Leslie Stephen, Herbert Spencer and S. Alexander, 
three of the leading evolutionary becUmkts, answer the 
question by pointing out that our activity is determined 
by the ideas and emotions present at the moment of 
decision. Now the present idea of a future pleasure or 
pain may be very different from the actual pleasure or 
pain, when it arrives. While the idea of the suffering 
which another will endure, together with our own after 
recollections of the same, may present a very vivid motive 
to perform the act. Thus our own good is the motive 
after all. As Spencer points out, the pains of another 
may be as clear to us as our own future pains. Our sym- 
pathies are strongest where we have ourselves experienced 
the sufferings which we now see in another. And with 
sufferings which we have never experienced our sym- 
pathies are correspondingly weak. The actual pain or 
pleasure of another is not, therefore, our motive in altru- 
istic activity, but the ideas of those pains and pleasures 
which exist in our own minds. 

There is no doubt considerable force in this line of 
reasoning. Yet A. E. Taylor, in his Problem of Conduct, 
denies that it has any validity; taking the ground that 
we have no present idea of future pleasures and pains at 
all. But this view is certainly erroneous. I have said 
above that from the standpoint of Hedonism altruistic 
conduct is illogical. But because it is illogical, it by no 
means follows that it cannot be accounted for. There are 
other impulses of the same kind. Superstitious feelings 
are also illogical, but one cannot for that reason free him- 
self from them. The child shrieks with terror when his 
little brother plays bear, knowing all the while that there 
is no real danger. Adults will do the same at the sight of 
an artificial snake, or even a jaek-in-the-box. Many 
people do not like to start on a journey on Friday, or to 
sit at a table with twelve others, or to break a looking- 
glass, or to give or receive an edged present. They laugh 
at their own feelings, but cannot shake them off. Some 
people dare not stand near a precipice because the 
impulse to leap over is too strong to be resisted. Some 



68 A Plea tor Hed&atem. 

children cannot resist the impulse to handle or crush 
certain objects, knowing full well that they are obswved 
and will be punished. A man will often ftad it Impossible 
to resist the impulse to swear, or to tell some one what he 
thinks of him, even while he knows that the penalty will 
be heavy. Again, the impulse to laugh often comes on us 
at the most inopportune moments. We would give our 
right hand to hold it back, but on it comes. The impulse 
to take revenge or to wreak spite Is likewise often irresis- 
tible in the face of penalties. The impulse to play tricks 
is another instance. Everyone will recall children and 
even adults who could not resist the opportunity to play 
a practical joke, even though regretting the consequences 
at the very moment of acting. Now all these are really 
cases of disinterested, although not altruistic, activity. 
It is irresistible. Nature has implanted certain impulses 
in us which all our reason is not strong enough to over- 
come. Many of our impulses can in time be brought 
under control. When we perceive their evil consequences, 
we make a constant effort to rid ourselves of them. But 
in the case of altruistic impulses, the advantage to 
society leads men to approve the acts inspired by fehem, 
and thus they tend rather to become confirmed, because 
the approval tends to make them self-interested acts. 
Besides, as I have indicated above, nature selects for sur- 
vival the individuals who are strongly gifted with altru- 
istic impulses. 80 Thus these impulses tend to become 
stronger from generation to generation. But the indi- 
viduals who have the most vivid imaginations and can 
picture the pains and pleasures of others most readily 
will be those who will have the strongest sympathies. So 
nature will continue to select those individuals who find 
the most pleasure in promoting the pleasures of others, 
and who will do the most to lessen the pains of others. 
The activities inspired by these impulses are not then, 
strictly speaking, a part of voluntary conduct at all. 



50 Duhring, Der Wert des Lebens, cited by Hdffding, Hist. Mod. 
Philos., II., p. 560. 



A Plea wr Hedonism. 99 

They belong to the class of activities which nature takes 
care of— the instincts and reflex actions. 81 

As I have already indicated, Mr. Benjamin Kidd, in 
his Social Evolution and his Western Civilization, has 
emphasized more strongly than any other writer the share 
which nature takes in human evolution, by means of the 
evolution of the ethical and religious impulses. He brings 
a large array of facts to show that not intellectual devel- 
opment but moral and religious development have been the 
characteristics of the races which have won in the struggle 
for existence. The chief reason for this is that intellectual 
families die out. They are anxious to have their child- 
ren occupy as high a grade in society as they themselves 
occupy, and this desire retards marriage. Thus only 
five out of the five hundred noble families in England can 
trace back their ancestry in the male line to the fifteenth 
century. The same is true in France and probably in all 
other countries. The aristocracy is constantly dying out 
and being replaced by a new aristocracy. 52 Mere intellec- 
tual development, however high, is not sufficient to secure 
the persistence of the race. It is generally conceded, for 
instance, that the Greeks were the most highly, developed 
intellectually of any people who ever lived. Yet while 
they are still in existence, nominally, they were long 
ago outstripped in the race for existence, and there is 
probably very little if any of the blood of the ancient 
Atheneans now flowing in the veins of the Grecians. The 
old stock has entirely disappeared. They lack those 
traits of character which insure posterity or racial persis- 
tence. The same thing happened among the Romans. 
In the days of the empire the old families disappeared and 
were replaced by foreigners. Spain, France and England 
have had a similar experience. Nature, then, is constantly 
selecting for race preservation those individuals who 
have the social sentiments, love of offspring, devotion to 
family life, loyalty to clan, tribe, or city, pity for the weak 
and mit freude with the strong, most strongly developed. 

51 See Calkins, Introd. to Psyc, p. 333, et seq. 
52 See especially Soc. Evol. Chap. IX. 



60 A Pirn for Hedonism. 

The variation of social sentiment may be very slight, is in 
fact slight; but nature never overlooks these slight varia- 
tions. They may also be what we call accidental. (And 
that may mean mere blind chance, or the work of an 
unseen artificer working out a great design.) But so long 
as they are hereditary they answer the purpose of nature. 
Neither is it necessary that they be intellectually justifiable. 
To sacrifice self for others may seem unreasonable, but if 
nature impels us to do it, we must submit just as we 
submit to the trouble of finding food and drink when we 
are hungry or thirsty. 

But it will be objected that this view fails to account 
for the high esteem which is universally accorded to self- 
sacrifice. Let us see. In the first place, it is natural for 
the recipient to approve the beneficial act. This approval 
is not based on the personality of the act, that is, on the 
fact that it was voluntarily and consciously performed 
by an intelligent being. For we approve the beneficial 
acts of nature. When the stone we throw brings down 
the fruit or the game, when the seed we plant grows, and 
when the experiment we try succeeds, we have this 
feeling of approval. In the next place, experience teaches 
us that the man who is capable of self-sacrifice is 
a desirable companion. The sacrificial act is an index to 
the character fit for society. It indicates the presence of 
of a "good" man, one who will not break promises, lie, 
steal nor in other ways prove himself unsocial. It indi- 
cates what we call a "good-natured" man. But we 
approve and love good-natured animals as well as good- 
natured men. Animals which are affectionate, tameable, 
not given to treachery nor to fits of anger, which are 
obedient and tractable, which are playful and good- 
humored are taken up as companions by men and loved. 
And who will undertake to draw a line between the 
altruistic activity of a brute and that of a man? The 
maternal instinct is as strong, if not stronger, in the 
former as in the latter; the gregarious or social instinct is 
as strong if not stronger, for man is by no means so 
gregarious as the herbivorous animals and certain birds. 
Nor is the social instinct equally developed in all men. 



A Plea for Hedonism. 61 

Even those who live in large cities often confine their 
lives largely to the family. And many men prefer the 
seclusion of family life on a farm, far from the crowd. 
Seme even prefer solitary life. The instincts of pity* and 
generosity are perhaps more prominent in men than in 
brutes because men can perceive the consequences of 
actions more clearly. And yet the instinct of pity, or 
a£f< ction for the weak is certainly highly developed in 
many brutes. 

Again, we must remember that altruistic individuals 
oiiten cannot realize their own merits. The true hero can 
not understand the admiration of others. To the affec- 
tionate mother it seems only natural for mothers to love 
and care for their offspring. Her disapproval of unsym- 
pathetic parents arises from a feeling that they are lack- 
ing in "natural" traits. There is an instinctive dislike for 
defective or deformed people. (Hence we call an unsym- 
pathetic parent "unnatural.") And the sympathetic feel 
that the unsympathetic are defective. But to the sym- 
pathetic mother there is no feeling of special approval of 
other affectionate mothers; such conduct seems "natur- 
al." 68 The same is true in even a greater degree with the 
true hero. He does not feel that he has done anything 
extraordinary. 54 He has simply done what his nature 
called him to do. There is no sense of effort or strain, 
because there is in fact no unnatural strain. The hero is 
humble, because he is not conscious of having done any- 
thing to be proud of. The proud hero (and they are 
numerous enough) is one who perceives the advantage of 
heroism. He knows that people admire strength, beauty, 
skill, endurance, energy and success, and having one or 
more of these traits he admires himself and enjoys by 
anticipation the pleasures of admiration and praise. He 
knows that people admire and approve self-discipline as 
well as self-sacrifice, aud he is willing to pay the price for 
the popular admiration and approval. This admiration 
and approval of power, whether in form of strength, 

^epken, Science of Bthie& p. 26£ %n& Ut&,» X, P- 259- 
M Jacob A. Riis, The Making of an American, pi 423. 



62 A Plea, for Hedonism. 

beauty, skill, eloquence, endurance, energy, cunning, or 
of training and self-discipline, is partly hereditary and 
partly institutional. 86 The advantages of power, both 
for the individual and for the race, is so apparent that we 
should expect it to be approved and encouraged. Train- 
ing and self-discipline are especially valuable both for the 
individual and for the race. And the step from self-dis- 
cipline to altruistic self-sacrifice is so short that it is 
taken unconsciously. In our admiration for the trained 
man, we usually fail to distinguish between the two. And 
even the philosopher finds it hard to draw the line. 56 

4. Abnormal Altruism. 

That the altruistic impulses are of natural origin is 
further shown by the fact that, like selfish impulses, they 
are liable to be abnormally and hence injuriously developed. 
The mother may be so affectionate as to "spoil" her child, 
or break down her own health. 57 The generous man may 
give away all his property, thereby injuring himself and, 
what is of more importance, those who are dependent on 
him for a living, especially his immediate family. The 
patriot usually neglects those who are immediately depend- 
ent on him. 58 The reformer is apt to do the same. The man 
who is gifted with too much pity cannot be just. Rogues 
and rascals constantly impose on his good-nature. This 
is why it is said that women would not make good judges 
or jury-men. They could not render a fair decision or 
verdict. (I do not make this assertion myself, but quote 
the common opinion.) The hero is not so cautious as the 
selfish man, and is more apt to lose his life. Bravery 
often becomes reckless daring, if not foolhardiness. The 
over-sympathetic man finds it hard to tell the truth when 
the truth will hurt a friend, hard to be honest when dis- 

55 Comp. Ladd, Phil, of Conduct, Chap. XI, p. 231. 

S6 See, for instance, Bradley, Appearance and Reality, chapter on 
"Goodness." 

S7 6ee Spencer, Ethics, I, $72. 

•"Tel soulage le miserable, qui neglige sa famille et laisse son fils 
tfaflsl'indigence."— I^a Bruyere, Characteres, Ch. XII, p. 375.' (Ed. 
1890.) 



A Plea tor Hedonism. 68 

honesty will help a neighbor at the expense of a stranger. 
The Japanese are said to be so polite that they will com- 
mit almost any crime rather than hurt the feelings of 
other people. 

Thus altruism presents a problem within a problem. 
Traits of character which were intended to preserve the 
race, tend when excessive to destroy the social order, and 
thereby the race itself. But as all altruistic activity is 
illogical, how shall excessive altruism be curbed? We can 
nob reason with the altruistic person. He is acting 
according to his nature. All that is left to do is to dis- 
approve such conduct so strongly that in time this disap- 
proval will act on his feelings. Nature herself will also 
tend to weed out the excessively altruistic. It is this 
excessive altruism which Nietzsche and his followers object 
to. 59 Nietzsche would apparently have us select and breed 
men as we select and breed horses, cattle and sheep. But 
assuming the possibility of doing so, we must still deter- 
mine the ideal character for man; and the question then 
arises whether the emotional or sympathetic character is 
not the ideal, and if so, how it may best be secured? 
They argue that our sympathy interferes with race evo- 
lution, and their argument is apparently just. Too much 
sympathy, pity and generosity tend to make the idle and 
shiftless more so. But Nietzsche goes too far in his 
demands. Even among animals, where the struggle for 
existence has full play, it is not the strongest and most 
cunning individuals that survive, but the most sympa- 
thetic. Any attempt, therefore, to lend a hand in the 
struggle for existence by helping the strong to survive 
against the weak would probably result either in the 
destruction of the whole race, or the nation that tried the 
experiment. 

5. Moral Education. 

It is well known that to a certain extent we can 
educate or repress either the selfish or the altruistic 
impulses in oausselves or others, Shall we educate the 

59 The Twilight of the Godp\ ' 



64 A PJea wr Hedonism. 

selfish and repress the altruistic emotions or the reverse? 
Here again it seems to me that we must resort to,the 
canon of consequences. We have pointed out above 
that the most altruistic impulses are at the same time 
beneficial to self. I believe that science will show in time 
that those pseudo-altruistic impulses are inextricably 
united with the altruistic impulses which are beneficial to 
the race but prejudicial to the individual, when considered 
by themselves. If this is the case, no one will want to rid 
himself of those socially beneficial impulses. Thus if my 
neighbor's vine has overgrown my fruit tree, I will not tear 
down the vine to preserve my fruit if by tearing it down 
I shall at the same time kill my tree. So in a case where 
the individual interests clearly conflict with those of 
society and the individual lacks the sympathetic 
impulses necessary to make him strive for the social 
interest rather than his own, he must still inquire whether 
he should not seek to cultivate the lacking impulses for 
the sake of other impulses which will accompany them. 
As we pointed out above the altruistic impulses which are 
beneficial to self can only be acquired by a self-discipline 
that will make them practically mechanical, and when 
they have become so habitual as to be reflex, or mechan- 
ical, they will act in cases which will be injurious to self as 
well as in cases which are beneficial to self. In other 
words, the character which wisdom requires in order to 
secure the greatest possible happiness to the individual in 
his environment on earth is an organic unit of an altru- 
istic nature. He who seeks to reach the highest possible 
earthly happiness by the strictly selfish road will not 
succeed. The so-called paradox of Hedonism is one of the 
deepest and most wonderful laws of human nature. One 
must build up an altruistic character to attain such 
peace on earth as is given to men to enjoy. As Maeter- 
link so beautifully points out, 60 "The true sage must 
suffer. He suffers, and suffering forms a constituent part 
of his wisdom. He will suffer, perhaps, more than most 
men, for his nature is far more complete. And being 

^Wisdom and Bestiny, Sec, 39 



A Plea tor Hedonism. 65 

nearer to all mankind, as the wise must ever be, his suffer- 
ings will be the greater, for the sorrows of others are his." 
And yet the true sage enjoys a peace that passeth under- 
standing. At the end of life he can say with Paul: 
"I have fought a good fight." His cup of sorrow may be 
fuller, but he will drink it willingly. The path of wisdom 
is so sweet and peaceful, that no one would exchange it 
for all the paths of temporal pleasure. Thus the 
apparent conflict between self-culture and social justice is 
resolved into a higher unity, just as all the apparent 
conflicts in the universe resolve themselves into higher 
unities when our knowledge has widened sufficiently to 
perceive the broader laws. The world is full of conflicts 
and contradictions for the ignorant, but as knowledge 
widens, the conflicts disappear one by one, until at last 
we grasp the conception of the unity of nature. 

Thus pure disinterested altruism is an ineradicable 
accompaniment of self-interested altruism, and hence of 
Hedonism itself. Not only so, but experience proves that 
purest hedonistic results may be best attained by direct- 
ing the thought to the social or unselfish aspect of 
conduct than by the reverse process. Yet so long as one 
clearly realizes from the start that his own greatest 
happiness will follow the former course, he is a consistent 
hedonist. And with that knowledge constantly before 
him, he will not be apt to fall into the excesses of an 
abnormal altruism. Justice to self will regulate justice to 
others. The ideal of self-culture will serve as a model for 
social culture. 

VI. CONCLUSION. 

A few words will suffice by way of conclusion. Glan- 
cing back over the line of our argument it will be seen that 
we tried to show first that "Man's Place in Nature" has 
been determined by the general course of universal evolu- 
tion and is largely independent of his own desires and 
wishes. We might have gone further and shown that so 
far as "Man's Place in Nature" is concerned, the problem 
of conduct is only a temporal problem. The evidence 
points very clearly to the recent origin of the human race 



66 A Plea for Hedonism. 

on earth; and it points almost as clearly to the rather 
early termination of man's earthly existence, speaking in 
terms of the infinite ages of eternity. In view of these 
facts, we recognized the importance for the problem of 
conduct of any light which either science, theology or re- 
velation can throw on the problem of man's nature and 
ultimate destiny. 

For the philosopher, the problem of earthly existence 
can never seem supremely important, unless that exist- 
ence is in some way related to an after life. If the earthly 
life be all, the ethical problem at times seems hardly 
worth the solving. And yet while this is true, there is no 
ground for despising the earthly life. Moral science is 
still at least as important as any of the other sciences. 
As a sentient creature, man may as well make the most 
of the earthly life which science and revelation will permit. 
The strength of Hedonism lies in its insistance on the 
worth and dignity of the earthly life, even while we are 
still in uncertainty as to the after-life. It would be idle 
here to attempt to force conclusions upon the reader. 
The most learned men have differed in opinion as to the 
nature of the evidence in favor of an after-life. Some men 
find in man's moral nature satisfactory proofs of immor- 
tality. Others find the evidence insufficient and unsatis- 
factory. This much is certain, however. Some myster- 
ious power, which for convenience we have called nature 
in this essay, is shaping man's nature in a marvelous way, 
so as to adapt him more fully for social life. The human 
sentiments, and particularly the altruistic and sympathe- 
tic sentiments have always played and will always con- 
tinue to play a very important part in the development 
of the human race. One of the objects of this essay has 
been to discover just what part the involuntary part of 
man's nature and what part his intelligence plays in the 
matter of conduct. Our conclusion was, that the province 
of intelligence tends constantly to encroach upon the 
domain of the emotions. But we also found that certain 
emotions, by their very nature were safe against the en- 
croachments of intelligence and that as to these emotions, 
to-wit: the altruistic, there is a tendency toward their 



A Plvn lor Hedonism. 67 

coincidence with the dictates of intelligence. When this 
point is reached man's character will have become ideal. 
Whether such a character is destined by nature to fit 
man for the earthly life alone or for a larger, broader, 
higher sphere of activity is a question which the writer 
will leave to the reader's own further consideration. 
From the stand-point of Hedonism, the earthly life, even 
if we concede that in some cases it is not under the present 
regime, will in the course of time become valuable in itself 
to humanity. In the mean time, ethics must ever remain 
the queen of all sciences. In the scale of interest and im- 
portance, ethics must ever rank above all the other intel- 
lectual inquiries of the scholar. But in thus speaking of. 
ethics, it must be taken to include the whole problem of 
human destiny. 



